Hawaii Enemies
For their sponsorship of Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox Sucker's www.paykids.com his Paykids Foundation, boycott the listed sponsors, including Art Van Furniture, Meijer Stores, Michigan State Medical Society (warning, the MSMS website does not like to let you out when you click the back button), SBC Communications, and Michigan Health and Hospital Association and tell them why you are boycotting them! Go to the Michigan Enemies of Freedom Page and read letters by Stan Rains and Terry Lear for more information as to why, and read Domino's Pizza, Inc.'s letter to me in response to my concerns about PayKid's use of Domino's Pizza gift certificates as a prize in their loathsome Billboard contest, which was CANCELLED!!
Not to be outdone, we are announcing our own billboard contest!
The Child Support Enforcement Agency in the Department of the Attorney General enforce child support orders.
Orders imposed by the administrative Office of Child Support Hearings are co-equal with orders imposed by the Family Court Judges. Both are null and void under 42 U.S.C. §1994, but that would require recognition that the Antipeonage Act exists. There are those who are in denial.
The Hawaii County Prosecuting Attorney, the Hawaii County Corporation Counsel, and the Maui County Prosecuting Attorney bring contempt proceedings against those who fail to maintain employment to enable compliance with child support orders.
A new completely un-American decision by the Supreme Court of Hawaii:
Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, No. 24457, (Hawaii, December 27, 2005) 109 Hawaii 240, 125 P. 3d. 461, a date which will live in infamy! No deep historical analysis by Justice Paula A. Nakayama of the Antipeonage Act, no citation of Jaremillo v. Romero, (1857) 1 N.M. (Gildersleeve) 190 or of Congressional Globe 39th Congress 2d. Sess. p. 1571. There is citation of California's Supreme Court decision in Brent Moss v. Superior Court, which is a tacit acknowledgement that California's Court of Appeals found that argument meritorious. Nevertheless, Justice Nakayama found the appeal "entirely frivolous."
Justices Ronald T.Y. Moon, Steven H. Levinson, Paula A. Nakayama, and substitute justices Lim, and Nakamura have hereby committed treason and forfeited their right to call themselves Americans. I hereby call upon the grand jury for the District of Hawaii to indict these judges for the crime defined by 18 U.S.C. §1581(a) and for other violations of federal criminal statutes that apply to conspiracy to violate civil rights, 18 U.S.C. §241, obstruction of justice and obstruction of the enforcement of federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§1581(b), misprision of federal felony, 18 U.S.C. §4, and aiding and abetting a federal felony, 18 U.S.C. §2. The doctrine of judicial immunity does not apply to criminal liability.
At least Tokyo Rose never did THIS to the United States of America!
The primary escape valve used by Moss in California and by Doe here is the canard that because the noncustodial parent is free to choose his employer, a court order requiring him to seek employment is not involuntary servitude or peonage. Moss even went on to find that such noncustodial parent could QUIT his job if he found the conditions intolerable.
I believe Adolf Hitler himself called that sort of thing "The Big Lie" method of propaganda. The noncustodial parent is free to quit his job if he can find another job right away or if he has wealth sufficient to allow compliance with the support order without employment. If not, then quitting his job can land him in jail.
Duh.
In my new Brief of Appellant before the Washington Court of Appeals in No. 57547-3, I have the answer to this bullshit:
4) That a
Debtor May Choose Employer or Profession Does
Not Defeat Claim of
Peonage
Page 7 of State’s Response to Respondent Knight’s Pro Se Motion to Modify the November 10, 2005 Order of Commissioner Sellers (State’s Response), Sub No. 209A, CP 57, addresses the issue of peonage:
In
sum, the Respondent is not required to work or labor to pay a debt in any
specific job or to any specific master or service. He has worked in the past as an engineer for
many years for the Boeing Company and has worked in the recent past for several
years as a contract paralegal for a number of different local and (sic)
attorneys. He is more than capable of
providing support for his children. He
simply prefers to file and present legal argument after legal argument rather
than to meet the most basic needs of his children. The Anti-Peonage Act simply does not apply to
this instance . . .
Addressed on point in Reynolds, supra, at 235 U.S. 146:
When thus at labor, the convict is working under a
contract which he has made with his surety.
He is to work until the amount which the surety has paid for him -- the
sum of the fine and the costs -- is paid.
The surety has paid the state and the service is rendered to reimburse
him. That is the real substance of the
transaction. The terms of that contract are agreed upon by the contracting parties,
as the result of their own negotiations.
The statute of the state does not prescribe them. It leaves the making of the contract to the
parties concerned, and this fact is not changed because of the requirement that
the judge shall approve the contract.
Emphasis added. Peonage Cases, supra, at 123 F. 674 found:
If the peon wished to change the
masters or service, he could find a new employer who would advance enough to
pay the peon’s debts to his then master, and the peon would then become bound
in the new employer’s service.
Same, Jaremillo, supra, at 1 N.M. 194, and:
If the servant does not wish to
continue in service for any cause, such as the ill-treatment of the master, and
receiving better pay from another;
Id., at 199, quoting New Mexico Territory’s Master and Servant Act of 1851. Thus, it is not fatal to a claim of peonage that the peon may choose his employer or even his profession. The surety as contemplated in Reynolds could be a manufacturing concern, a restaurant, or an engineering firm. Mr. Knight is in the same position as the peon who wishes to change masters or profession, he need only find an employer willing to pay such funds as the State demands.
5) Allowing
Debtor’s Choice of Employer or Profession to
Defeat Claim of
Peonage or Involuntary Servitude Will Allow
Human Traffickers and Pimps an
Unintended Loophole
To allow a debtor’s freedom to choose employer and profession to defeat a claim of peonage, when all other elements necessary to prove the claim, including sufficient level of plausible compulsion, are present, would render virtually unenforceable the Thirteenth Amendment, the Antipeonage Act, and the Peonage and Slavery Chapter.
A poor person agrees to pay with labor thousands of dollars to be smuggled into the United States illegally. Such indentures enforced with extortionate threats. An employer may threaten to rat an alien employee to the immigration authorities. Forced service as prostitutes. Wealthy foreigners may bring house servants to the United States and hold them in involuntary servitude. Federal authorities have obtained convictions for peonage or involuntary servitude under 18 U.S.C. §§1581 and 1584 and the predecessor statutes.
Bernal v. United States, (5th Cir. 1917) 241 F. 339 upheld a conviction of peonage where the defendant threatened a Mexican woman with telegraphing the immigration authorities and claimed that they would imprison her for five years. Bernal at 241 F. 341. Ms. Bernal wanted the Mexican woman work as a prostitute, who refused. She was then allowed to run errands around town under Ms. Bernal’s observation. Therefore, she had a choice as to how to earn her way out of this situation.
Cases involving women forced to labor include United States v. Harris, (10th Cir. 1976) 534 F. 2d. 207 affirming convictions of involuntary servitude and interstate transport of women for prostitution, and Pierce v. United States, (5th Cir. 1944) 146 F. 2d. 84 affirming convictions of peonage. United States v. Carter, (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F. 3d. 1089, 1090, restated these facts:
In June 1999, Carter took Jane Doe, aged 14, against her will from the State of Washington to the State of California intending to force her to work for him as a prostitute. Carter forced Doe to perform as a prostitute in Oakland, Los Angeles, and San Diego, beating her if she did not earn money to please him and physically punishing her for disobedience to him.
Carter brought Doe back to Seattle where he forced her to continue to work as a prostitute. He also forced her to aid him in recruiting her friend, Juvenile #1, also aged 14. Carter brought both juveniles to Portland, Oregon and then to Los Angeles to engage in prostitution. The two children ultimately escaped.
The sentence on conviction of violation 18 U.S.C. §2423, the Mann Act, was affirmed with enhancement as a crime of violence, Carter at 1091. These facts in Carter should easily have met the element of plausible compulsion for any charge of peonage or involuntary servitude.
United States v. Alzanki, (1st Cir. 1995) 54 F. 3d. 994 affirmed a conviction of involuntary servitude where the Kuwaiti defendant brought his Sri Lankan maid into Massachusetts and held her in bondage. Veerapol, supra, affirmed a conviction of involuntary servitude where the defendant held the passport of a citizen of Thailand and:
She maintained control over them through verbal abuse and threats of legal action and physical force. Veerapol refused Saeico’s frequent entreaties to allow her to return to Thailand, at one point telling her if she left, Veerapol would kill her. One night at her restaurant, Veerapol was particularly abusive to Saeico and pinched her arm, causing a large fist sized bruise. Veerapol also told her that the police in the United States would arrest her as an illegal alien were she to seek their help.
Veerapol at 312 F. 3d. 1131. Veerapol at 1132 adopted the level of “plausible compulsion” set forth in Kozminski, supra, at 487 U.S. 952.
If a human trafficker tells the
smuggled persons they are free to choose their job as long as they make
payments on their smuggling debt, he can avoid a conviction of a
§1581 or
§1584
crime if the State can avoid a finding that the
Order on Contempt, Sub No. 199,
CP 1-5, is declared null and void by
42 U.S.C. §1994 because Mr. Knight is free
to choose employer and profession. Even
if the human trafficker also told his passage debtors that they can earn the
money fastest by prostitution, and credibly threatened their lives if they
failed to make the payments. Such is a
level of plausible compulsion sufficient to otherwise prove the element of
involuntary servitude under
Kozminski
and
Veerapol.
Congress certainly did not intend such a loophole for human traffickers, pimps, or other such criminals.
Nor did they intend any such loophole in family law; from my Brief:
8)
The Antipeonage Act Covers Family Obligations
42
U.S.C. §1994 includes the phrase: “debt or obligation, or otherwise”. There is no language limiting the application
to debts arising from contract or excepting child support. State
v. Lenz, (Ct. App. 1999) 230 Wis. 529, 602 N.W. 2d. 172 found that as child
support is not a debt arising from contract, the language of Article I Section
16 of the
Wisconsin Constitution, “debts arising from contract”, does not
prohibit contempt proceedings for child support. Congress’ choice to not so limit the
application of
42 U.S.C. §1994 should be respected by the courts.
Had
the 1867 Congress intended to make an exception for alimony and child support,
it could have easily written in such language.[7]
If the language of
42 U.S.C. §1994
does not express the will of Congress in reasonably plain terms, then Senator
Lane’s comments recorded in the
Congressional
Globe, 39th Cong. 2d. Sess. at p. 1571, attached as an Exhibit to
Mr.
Knight’s Reply, Sub No. 209,
CP 41,
Exhibit attached herein, about the effects of New Mexico’s system on the
peon with a family to support answers the question:
By the laws of Mexico which
were existing in New Mexico at the time of the conquest peonage was
established. The system was simply this,
as I understand it: that where a Mexican owed a debt his creditor had a right
to his labor and services until that debt was paid. The debtor became a domestic servant, and he and his family were supported by the
creditor, and the peonage never ended until the debt was discharged. It was a kind of servitude for debt, which
the committee thought was inconsistent with our institutions. We simply say by this bill that peonage shall
be abolished, and the creditor shall be left to all his legal means of
collecting his debt, but he shall not hold the peon in slavery. I understand also that by this system the
creditor not only had a right by an involuntary process to the labor of the
peon, but the debtor if he chose might become the servant of the creditor and
serve until the debt is paid. A very
small debt with the interest, where the peon
has a family to support and the creditor supports him, amounts to servitude
for life. We now simply say that the
creditor in New Mexico shall have all the means of collecting their debts known
to law, but that peonage or servitude for debt shall cease. That is the whole of it.
Emphasis added. This statement was based in part on
Jaremillo, supra. Exhibit attached herein. At
1 N.M. 191 Jaremillo started with:
It has become
our duty for the first time in this tribunal to examine and construe the laws
of this territory, declaring the rights and defining the relations of masters
and servants. Like all questions arising
out of a domestic relation, the present involves interests important and
delicate.
Peonage was thus considered a domestic
relationship by those who practiced it.
Jaremillo, at 1 N.M. 199, quoting
New
Mexico’s Master and Servant Act of 1851, found:
Fathers of
families are permitted to bind out their children to serve only when their
poverty demands it, devoting what they draw on account of their salaries to the
support of their own legal families. . .
. All persons having servants may
advance them on account, when they demand it, two thirds of their salary in
order to support their families.
But other than certain specified cases, parents cannot contract away the services of their children, Id., at 206,[8] and that “if a servant is a parent and dies, the children are not compelled to serve in his stead,” Id., at 207.
Thus the regulation of peonage in New Mexico Territory was intimately related to family relationships and obligations. The 1867 Congress intended to abolish this, including any circumstance where family obligations are used to justify the peonage of either parent or child.
To deny this is like denying that a mile is eight furlongs, in the face of evidence that the National Bureau of Standards seems to think so!
My latest Reply Brief of Appellant provides the answers to California's Moss v. Superior Court, the Ninth Circuit's Ballek, and Hawaii's new Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, No. 24457, (Hawaii, December 27, 2005) 109 Hawaii 240, 125 P. 3d. 461.
My thanks to Steven L. Hartley, HSBA 6721 and Jen-L. W. Lyman, HSBA 7042 of Stirling & Kleintop in Honolulu for litigating this appeal. I would like to have your briefs to post on this website. I hope you petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari.
If this is how the courts treat noncustodial parents and our attorneys when we plead our rights as we are supposed to, then who can blame the sniper in Reno, Nevada for taking a shot at Washoe County Family Court Judge Charles Weller?
Article I Section 2 of the Hawaii Constitution provides for inherent rights, including the right to acquire and possess property. But for a non-custodial parent to claim such is to present a "frivolous" claim.
Article I Section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution provides the state Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. But for a non-custodial parent to claim such is to present a "frivolous" claim.
Article I Section 17 of the Hawaii Constitution provides for the right to keep and bear arms. It copies the Second Amendment.
Article I Section 19 of the Hawaii Constitution prohibits imprisonment for debt. But for a non-custodial parent to claim such is to present a "frivolous" claim.
I once worked out an imprisonment for debt argument for Hawaii. After updating, I include it on a web page to illustrate the lack of respect for the law and the English language in which it is written by the Hawaii courts. Because of the political climate, I am afraid that presented by itself, an imprisonment for debt argument has zero chance of success, a tiny chance if applied to a specific situation. However, if combined with an argument pleading the Antipeonage Act, the chance of success is greater, because you are offering the courts and the bureaucracy a choice: Give me the state constitution, or I will keep pushing the Antipeonage Act, ultimately to demand enforcement of the CRIMINAL provision, 18 U.S.C. §1581!
This is why I like the Antipeonage Act. It cuts through this Gordian Knot of non-law like Alexander's Sword.
Feel free to e-mail me at rogerwknight@hotmail.com with any information that you have to share.
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