Judge Thomas S. Zilly

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

 

ROGER W. KNIGHT,                                    )

                                                                        )

                                    plaintiff,                        )           No.  C00-151Z

            v.                                                         )

                                                                        )           MEMORANDUM IN

NORM MALENG. King County                     )           SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

Prosecuting Attorney, and CALVIN G.            )           SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RAPADA, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,          )

                                                                        )

                                    defendants.                   )           Noted for hearing: April 28, 2000

____________________________________)

 

            STANDARD OF DETERMINATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

            The presence or absence of a genuine issue as to material fact is the first issue that must be decided by the court in any summary judgment motion.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., (1986) 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d. 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, (1985) 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 91 L. Ed. 2d. 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 provide the ground rules for making this determination.  These ground rules are that the facts must be seen in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., (1970) 398 U.S. 144, 158-159, 26 L. Ed. 2d. 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598, but the non-moving party may not rest on her allegations, but must by her own affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for determination at trial, Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.  The Ninth Circuit adopted these same grounds rules in their essence in Retail Clerks Union Local 648, AFL-CIO v. Hub Pharmacy, Inc., (9th Cir 1983) 707 F. 2d. 1030.  The opposing party may not rest on conclusory allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing genuine issue of material fact.  Berg v. Kincheloe, (9th Cir. 1986) 794 F. 2d. 457, 459; Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, (9th Cir. 1987) 841 F. 2d. 872, 876.

NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS IN THIS CASE

            The facts of this case are adequately pled in the four Declarations of Roger W. Knight and their attached exhibits.  In the one pleading filed by the defendants, the King County Defendant’s Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the defendant did not deny any of the facts set forth by the plaintiff. Therefore, this action is ripe for a summary judgment based upon the law.  If this Motion is granted, the issue of damages due to the imprisonment of the plaintiff on March 28-29, 2000 will remain for determination in subsequent proceedings.

YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOES NOT APPLY, THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT JURISDICTION 

            This Court’s authority to enforce civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 has been qualified where the actions under color of state law involve state court proceedings, by the abstention doctrine defined by Younger v. Harris, (1971) 401 U.S. 37, 27 L. Ed. 2d. 669, 91 S. Ct. 746.  But Younger at 401 U.S.C. 46-54 defined exceptions to its doctrine of abstention, including lack of adequate remedy in state courts, particularly where conflict of interest arises.  In this case, the conflict of interest arises from possible criminal liability of court personnel for violating or aiding and abetting the violation of 18 U.S.C. §1581 in the enforcement of support orders.  Any violation of 42 U.S.C. §1994 is arguably a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1581.

            Child support orders are widely enforced in the State of Washington with contempt proceedings.  Except in the exceedingly few cases where the noncustodial parent is sufficiently wealthy to allow compliance with support order without employment, the clear purpose is to coerce employment to allow compliance or to punish willful unemployment to escape compliance.  If this is a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1994, it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1581.

            Plaintiff has and will continue to raise his federal question in state proceedings, but he is asking state court judges to find themselves guilty of repeated felonies of peonage.  The doctrine of judicial immunity does not apply to criminal liability.  Judges can be prosecuted for enforcing peonage.  So can other state officers, regardless of any authorization or requirement of state law, Clyatt v. United States, (1905) 197 U.S. 207, 49 L. Ed. 726, 15 S. Ct. 429.  In Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388, 1 L. Ed. 648, Justice Chase listed “law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause;” as among the laws that is against all reason and justice for a people to empower a Legislature to enact.  Therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have.  If the plaintiff is asking state court judges to find themselves guilty of numerous felonies of peonage, then Younger abstention does not apply due to lack of adequate opportunity to raise such a federal question in state court.

            Therefore, this Court has the authority where appropriate to enjoin state court proceedings under 42 U.S.C. §1983, which creates a statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §2283.  Mitchum v. Foster, (1972) 407 U.S. 225, 32 L. Ed. 2d. 669, 91 S. Ct. 746.

RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THIS ACTION

            There are significant differences in this action and in the previous action before this Court, Knight v. Knight, et al, W.D. Wash. No. C91-949Z.

            In the previous action, the plaintiff had not yet been prosecuted for contempt for nonpayment of support and he was not in any danger of such prosecution.  At that time he was still employed by The Boeing Company and 50% of his net income was withheld and remitted to the Washington State Support Registry.  This present action is in response to contempt proceedings that have not happened.  Please See Declaration of Roger W. Knight, Third Declaration of Roger W. Knight, and Fourth Declaration of Roger W. Knight and attached Exhibits.  This alone is a new transaction that precludes res judicata.

            Subsequent to the previous action, four published opinions that have bearing on this case have come out that were not available when the previous action was litigated.  These published opinions are: Brent Moss v. Superior Court, (1996) 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 864, 868-870, affirmed in part and reversed in part, (1998) 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 215, 950 P. 2d. 59; United States v. Ballek, (9th Cir. 1999) 170 F. 3d. 871, cert. den. 145 L. Ed. 2d. 114, 120 S. Ct. 318; and Lambert v. Ackerley, (9th Cir. 1999) 180 F. 3d. 997, 1003, which defined the standard by which remedial statutes intended to protect individual rights are to be interpreted.  The existence of these published opinions represent a change of circumstances that precludes res judicata.

BALLEK DOES NOT BIND THIS COURT AS TO THIS ACTION, IT IS IRRELEVANT

            Ballek, supra arose from a prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. §228, the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), a statute that does not affect Mr. Knight, Knight v. United States, W.D. Wash. No C93-13WD, vacated 12 F. 3d. 1107, unpublished decision noted on table.  Available on-line at 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32210.  The facts relevant to any liability of the plaintiff for violation of 18 U.S.C. §228, have not changed, Second Declaration of Roger W. Knight, pages 1-2.  The children reside in Maple Valley, Washington and the plaintiff resides in Federal Way, Washington.

            Ballek only contemplated whether the Thirteenth Amendment was violated by the CSRA, 18 U.S.C. §228.  It did not rule on whether any state court prosecution for nonpayment of support violates the Antipeonage Act.  Therefore, it does not apply to the claim the plaintiff makes for the protection of the Antipeonage Act.

CONGRESS PROHIBITED LEGALLY COERCED LABOR TO ENFORCE THE OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT A FAMILY WITH THE ANTIPEONAGE ACT, AND IS AUTHORIZED TO ENACT SUCH PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

 

            The Antipeonage Act, passed in 1867 as appropriate legislation to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, survives in 18 U.S.C. §1581 and 42 U.S.C. §1994.  42 U.S.C. §1994 reads:

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.

 

            That Congress very clearly intended to prohibit the involuntary service or labor of any peon in liquidation of any obligation to provide support for his family is proved beyond reasonable doubt by Senator Lane’s speech on the Peonage Bill:

By the laws of Mexico which were existing in New Mexico at the time of the conquest peonage was established.  The system was simply this, as I understand it: that where a Mexican owed a debt his creditor had a right to his labor and services until that debt was paid.  The debtor became a domestic servant, and he and his family were supported by the creditor, and the peonage never ended until the debt was discharged.  It was a kind of servitude for debt, which the committee thought was inconsistent with our institutions.  We simply say by this bill that peonage shall be abolished, and the creditor shall be left to all his legal means of collecting his debt, but he shall not hold the peon in slavery.  I understand also that by this system the creditor not only had a right by an involuntary process to the labor of the peon, but the debtor if he chose might become the servant of the creditor and serve until the debt is paid.  A very small debt with the interest, where the peon has a family to support and the creditor supports him, amounts to servitude for life.  We now simply say that the creditor in New Mexico shall have all the means of collecting their debts known to law, but that peonage or servitude for debt shall cease.  That is the whole of it.

 

  Congressional Globe, 39th Cong. 2d. Ed. p. 1571, attached to the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and authenticated by the Second Declaration of Roger W. Knight. 

            “where the peon has a family to support and the creditor supports him, amounts to servitude for life.”  That is an accurate description of a child support order.  A father is deprived of custody of his child, the child is supported by someone else, either the mother or a state agency foolishly spending the taxpayer’s money, and he is thus held in servitude for life.

            The Vagrancy Act of 1860, then in force in New Mexico Territory, included within its definitions of vagrants “Persons who shall have abandoned their families, leaving them without the means of their support”.[1]  When a person was convicted of vagrancy in a New Mexican court, the sentence usually included a stiff fine that was paid by a wealthy person, who then owned the labor of the convicted vagrant.  This is what is meant by the phrase: “and in case he shall be sold as hereinafter provided.”  The convicted vagrant became a peon to the master who paid the fine.  It was used as a means to enforce child support obligations of parents with and without custody of their children.

            As this was Congress’s intent, the defendants have yet to provide any evidence or argument whatsoever to the contrary, the Antipeonage Act prohibits coercion of employment to pay child support.  Once the Antipeonage Act is passed by Congress, it does not change unless Congress specifically changes it.  Courts and prosecutors do not have the authority to change it by means of nonenforcement and unpunished violation.  Such usurps that democratic process that went into its passage.

            The Antipeonage Act is appropriate legislation authorized by Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.  It is a remedial statute, one designed by Congress to protect individual rights, particularly the right of those who toil to cease toiling.  As found by the Supreme Court in Pollack v. Williams, (1944) 322 U.S. 4, 18, 64 S. Ct. 792, 799, 88 L. Ed. 1095:

                        Congress has put it beyond debate that no indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free of compulsory service.  This Congressional policy means that no state can make the quitting of work any component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to labor.

 

            The Antipeonage Act is a dual purpose statute.  Because this statute defined any attempt by virtue of state law to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise to be null and void and denounced as a crime any such attempt, Congress thus raised both a shield and a sword against forced labor because of debt.  Pollack at 322 U.S. 8.

            Thus it matters not that the criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. §1581, the sword, does not by itself provide a civil right that may be enforced in an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, see United States v. Kozminsky, (1988) 487 U.S. 931, 101 L. Ed. 2d. 788, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2758-9 (finding criminal sanction of 18 U.S.C. §1584 did not provide a civil right enforceable through prosecution of conspiracy to violate civil rights under 18 U.S.C. §241, but not fatal to prosecution for conspiracy to violate Thirteenth Amendment itself which does provide a civil right).  42 U.S.C. §1994, the shield, provides the civil right.

            The purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Antipeonage Act is to provide a system of universal free and voluntary labor.  Pollack at 322 U.S. 6.  If the duty to provide for a child is an exception to this rule, then such universally free and voluntary labor will not exist because the majority of the adult population has children.  With few exceptions, all parents have a common law duty to provide for their children.  There is no way that this duty can be used to create an exception to the prohibition of coerced labor that applies to noncustodial parents, without also depriving custodial parents, including parents who were married at time of birth of their children and have never divorced or sought public assistance.  Should any state endeavor to legally coerce the employment of custodial parents, the Ballek decision would stand in the way of any such parent’s attempt to assert their rights in the courts.  However, Ballek did not contemplate the Antipeonage Act.

            An en banc panel of Ninth Circuit judges provided the standard by which remedial statutes passed to enforce individual rights are to be interpreted in deciding a case arising from another remedial statute designed by Congress to protect the rights of those who toil, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§201-219.  In Lambert v. Ackerley, (9th Cir. 1999) 180 F. 3d. 997, 1003, the en banc panel found:

            Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court determined the approach that must be followed in construing the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. A number of the other circuits have explicitly followed that approach. It is a simple one, often used in construing statutes designed to protect individual rights. In Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597, 64 S. Ct. 698, 88 L. Ed. 949 (1944), the Court explained that because the FLSA is a remedial statute, it must be interpreted broadly. As the Tennessee Coal Court wrote:

[The FLSA is] remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil. . . Those are rights that Congress has specifically legislated to protect. Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner

 

As the FLSA must be interpreted broadly, so must the Antipeonage Act, which is a remedial statute designed by Congress to protect individual rights.

            Parents ordered to pay child support must be included in the group of those who toil.  The child support orders are based directly upon the income that such parents can earn with their toil.  The right to be free from involuntary servitude based upon a debt or obligation or otherwise is a right Congress has specifically legislated to protect.  There is no doubt that the Congress of 1867 knew about alimony and child support obligations, and knew about the general duty to support children that the common law imposed upon parents with and without custody of their children.

            The Ninth Circuit has recently recognized that the duty to support a child predates the Thirteenth Amendment and was well known.  Ballek, supra at 170 F. 3d. 871, 874 n. 2 citing Stanton v. Willson (Connecticut 1808) 3 Day 37.  The 1867 Congress certainly knew about it, it was included in their reports on New Mexican peonage.  If Congress intended to exclude child support from the phrase “debt or obligation, or otherwise” they had the option of simply writing into the statute a phrase such as “except the obligation of a parent to support his children”.  They did not.  Perhaps because they realized that it would effectively strip the protection of the Thirteenth Amendment from all those who have children, which is most of the adult population.

            While the Ballek court has chosen to interpret and apply the Thirteenth Amendment in a narrow, grudging manner, the Lambert court found that remedial statutes designed to protect individual rights are to be interpreted broadly to effect the protection Congress intended.  That can only mean that child support is included in the statutory phrase “debt or obligation, or otherwise” within the Antipeoange Act.

            Even if coercion of employment to pay child support is within the narrow exceptions to the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection, Congress has the authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to enforce the prohibition of involuntary servitude with appropriate legislation when it finds child support to not justify coercion of employment.  The Antipeonage Act provides a protection that goes beyond the protection of the Thirteenth Amendment, specifically that it prohibits the use of any debt or obligation to impose involuntary servitude, even some debts and obligations that have been found to not offend the Thirteenth Amendment.  If the reason is because a more restrictive interpretation of the constitutional provision prevents “liberty under the protection of effective government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers”, Butler v. Perry, (1916) 240 U.S. 328, 333, 60 L. Ed. 328, 36 S. Ct. 258, this does not preclude Congress from nevertheless legislating a more restrictive interpretation.  Examples would be a statute prohibiting states and state officers from legally requiring citizens to perform roadwork, or from legally coercing employment to pay taxes, child support, or other debts and obligations.

            Congress can within such essential powers repeal or modify the Antipeonage Act to exclude child support from its definition of “debt or obligation, or otherwise,” if such exclusion is found by the Supreme Court to not offend the Thirteenth Amendment, but such obligation found to be included in the Antipeonage Act as it presently exists.  All it takes is individual senators and representatives risking the wrath of noncustodial parents who vote (keeping in mind that custodial parents who vote also have a duty to support their children, and can thus be endangered by any such alteration of the Antipeonage Act).  Should noncustodial parents take the same attitude toward the Thirteenth Amendment that gun owners have taken toward the Second Amendment, and that women outside the Christian right have taken toward the right to an abortion, that might prove difficult.  But that is the democratic process, and neither courts nor prosecutors should alter or repeal the Antipeonage Act by nonenforcement and unpunished violation, thus usurping the democratic process that occurred in 1867.

            The Supreme Court has found that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to extend equal protection doctrine beyond what it found to be contemplated by the Amendment itself.  Congress may do this as long as its legislation is rationally related to the positive grant of power authorizing Congress as to its discretion as to what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Katzenbach v. Morgan, (1966) 384 U.S. 641, 648-651, 16 L. Ed. 2d. 828, 86 S. Ct. 1717.  Same doctrine applies to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, (1966) 383 U.S. 301, 15 L. Ed. 2d. 769, 86 S. Ct. 803.  Congress may not use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict protections found to be guaranteed by the Amendment itself, Morgan at 384 U.S. 651 note 10.

            The same doctrine applies to Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., (1968) 392 U.S. 409, 413, 437-444, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 1189, 88 S. Ct. 2186 finding 42 U.S.C. §1982, originally passed in 1866, was a valid exercise of Section 2 power.  Congress has the power under Section 2 to do much more than simply abolish slavery and establish universal freedom.  Jones at 392 U.S. 439.

            Thus Congress intended to prohibit legally coerced labor to support a family with passage of the Antipeonage Act, has prohibited such legally coerced labor, and has the authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit such legally coerced labor.

CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated herein, this Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

            RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, April 6, 2000.

 

                                                            ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, plaintiff

 


If the back button does not take you there, click Home to go to the Index page of this Antipeonage Act Website, click Enemies for the main Enemies page, click Letters for the Letters page, and click Allies for the Allies page.  Click 00-35625 to get to the main page for this case.  Or you can use the Antipeonage Act Site Map.

[1] Vagrancy Act of 1860, New Mexico Territory, official English language version (Laws of New Mexico Territory were officially enacted in both Spanish and English):  Section 11: The following described persons shall be considered vagrants: (2)(d) Persons who shall have abandoned their families, leaving them without the means of support.  Section 14: . . . and in the case the accused shall be found guilty of vagrancy, it shall be the duty of the probate judge to confine him or her, as the case may be, in jail for the term of twenty days, unless he shall give bond to the Territory, with one or more securities, to be approved by the probate judge, in the sum of at least one hundred dollars, conditioned for his or her good conduct for the term of one year; and if during the year the accused shall commit any act of vagrancy or any crime or misdemeanor, the person under bond shall be subject to a fine; and if he shall have a family, such fine shall, when collected, be applied to the support thereof, or the support of any other person who by law he is compelled to maintain; and in case he shall be sold as hereinafter provided.