Judge Steven C. Gonzalez

Noted for 11:00 am Friday, December 9, 2005

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

 

STATE OF WASHINGTON ex rel.                )

                                                                        )           No.  90-3-04471-1 SEA

                                    petitioner,                     )

                                                                        )           REPLY TO STATE’S RESPONSE TO

            v.                                                         )           RESPONDENT KNIGHT’S PRO SE

                                                                        )           MOTION TO MODIFY THE

Roger William Knight.                                       )           NOVEMBER 10, 2005 ORDER OF

                                                                        )           COMMISSIONER SELLERS

                                    respondent.                  )

____________________________________)

 

            Comes now, ROGER W. KNIGHT, the respondent, and responds to the State’s Response to Respondent Knight’s Pro Se Motion to Modify the November 10, 2005 Order of Commissioner Sellers (State’s Response).

1. STATE’S RESPONSE UNTIMELY SERVED, SHOULD BE STRICKEN

            Local Civil Rule 7(b)(2)(A) provides that LR 7 shall apply to motions to revise commissioner’s rulings.  LR 7(b)(3)(C) provides that:

Any party opposing a motion shall file the original responsive papers in opposition to a motion, serve copies on parties and deliver copies to the hearing Judge via the Judges’ mailroom in the courthouse in which the Judge is located, no later than 12:00 noon two court days before the date the motion is to be considered.

 

            This includes “serves copies on parties”.  Mr. Knight, please see Declaration of Roger W. Knight in Support of Reply to State’s Response to Motion to Modify Commissioner’s Ruling (Knight Declaration), received his copy of the State’s Response on Thursday, December 8, 2005.  The hearing on this Motion is currently scheduled for 11:00 am Friday, December 9, 2005.  The deadline for service is of the State’s Response is thus 12:00 noon Wednesday, December 7, 2005.  It was served by mail, the postmark on the envelope indicates that it was placed in the mail on December 7, 2005, leaving less than the extra three days for mail service required by Civil Rule 6(e).  This renders impossible any compliance by Mr. Knight for serving this Reply before 12:00 noon Thursday, December 8, 2005 as required by LR 7(b)(3)(D).

            Pursuant to LR 7(b)(3)(E), the State’s Reply should be stricken.  Opposing counsel hereby objects.

2.  NO DISPUTE THAT ORDER REQUIRES EMPLOYMENT OR THE SEEKING OF EMPLOYMENT 

            On page 1 of the State’s Response the Order is quoted as follows:

“providing proof that at any time he was not employed at lest 30 hours per week with Mr. King or any other employer, he shall seek/do 3 job contacts per week.”  See Page 4, requirement 5 of Agreed Order of Contempt.

 

Thus, this fact is a verity.

3. ISSUE THAT ORDER REQUIRING EMPLOYMENT OR THE SEEKING OF EMPLOYMENT IS DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE ANTIPEONAGE ACT NOT PRECLUDED, STATE HAS NOT MET BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH PRECLUSION 

            The State cites other litigation involving Mr. Knight, and asserts that the issue raised by Mr. Knight, that the terms of the Order in question are declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994, the Antipeonage Act of 1867, is precluded by this other litigation.  The cases cited were in response to the WorkFirst Act, Laws 1997 chapter 58 creating RCW 74.20A.320, providing for the suspension of licenses, and not in response to any contempt proceeding imposing any requirement to be employed or to seek employment.  The Ninth Circuit decisions were unpublished memoranda which do not create precedent and are barred from citation with a few exceptions by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.  These Ninth Circuit decisions did not address the United States District Court’s (Western District of Washington) findings that it lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman[1] doctrine and had to abstain under Younger v. Harris[2], and therefore did not overturn these findings.  Dismissal by federal court for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue does not operate as an adjudication on the merits with preclusive effect, Deja Vu, Inc. v City of Federal Way, (1999) 96 Wash. App. 255, 263, 979 P. 2d. 464.

            The federal cases were in response to criminal prosecutions for Driving While License Suspended (DWLS) brought by Mercer Island after the state court found itself barred from considering the validity of the license suspension in a criminal case.  Mr. Knight ultimately prevailed in the criminal DWLS cases after Judge Michael Trickey of this Court reversed the Mercer Island DWLS convictions on the basis that Mercer Island had to prove service required by RCW 74.20A.320(1) had been completed.  City of Mercer Island v. Knight, King County Superior Court No. 02-1-01137-0 SEA.

            The burden of proof is on the party asserting preclusion, Shuman v. Dep’t of Licensing, (2001) 108 Wash. App. 673, 681-682, 32 P. 2d. 1011 citing Thompson v. Dep’t of Licensing, (1999), 138 Wash. 2d. 783, 790, 982 P. 2d. 601.  The State does not submit evidence sufficient to establish preclusion.  Mr. Knight thus does not need to submit evidence to the contrary.

            The employment and employment seeking requirements of the Order constitute a fact that has never previously existed with respect to Mr. Knight, even though it is a fact that exists for numerous other noncustodial parents.  The impoundment of an automobile and restriction on the privilege to operate a motor vehicle under the WorkFirst Act is not this fact.  While the potential of such fact resulting from these matters might have been available for the other courts in the other litigation to consider, the actual fact of a court ordered requirement to be employed or to seek employment has never been available for the other courts’ considerations in the other litigation cited by the State.

4.  IMPORTANT ISSUES OF LAW ARE NOT PRECLUDED

            In matters of important public policy, any assertion of preclusion is futile.  Res judicata and collateral estoppel are equitable doctrines with equitable exceptions.  Preclusion should not be applied where it works injustice, Henderson v. Bardahl International Corp., (1967) 72 Wash. 2d. 109, 119, 431 P. 2d. 961 for res judicata and In re Metcalf, (1998) 92 Wash. App. 165, 174, 963 P. 2d. 911 citing State v. Williams, (1997) 132 Wash. 2d. 248, 254, 937 P. 2d. 1052 for collateral estoppel.  Res judicata is not intended to deny a litigant his day in court, Schoeman v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1986) 106 Wash. 2d. 855, 860, 726 P. 2d. 1, citing Luisi Truck Lines, Inc. v. Utilities and Transportation Commission, (1967) 72 Wash. 2d. 887, 894-7, 435 P. 2d. 654.  Res judicata and collateral estoppel are not to be applied so rigidly as to deny litigant his day in court, primary purpose of the courts is to administer justice.

            Metcalf’s specific findings are particularly applicable here.  At 92 Wash. App. 174-176 Metcalf found:

            The federal action was a challenge to the received funds statute, and advanced ex post facto, double jeopardy, due process, bill of attainder, and excessive fine claims identical to those asserted by Metcalf.  While the federal action did not directly address the wage deduction statute, the received funds statute explicitly incorporates the proportioning methodology of the wage deduction statute. See RCW 72.09.480 (adopting deduction arm of RCW 72.09.111(1)(a)). The analysis of constitutional issues raised by both statutes is therefore the same, except that any issues raised solely under the wage statute would be less compelling; inmates have no constitutional property interest in receiving prison wages, see Hrbek v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1986), whereas they do in receiving money from outside sources, see Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985). Metcalf concedes that the analogous state constitutional provisions upon which he relies receive an interpretation identical to the analogous federal ones. Several of Metcalf's constitutional issues are thus identical to issues resolved in Wright.

            The adjudication in Wright ended in a final judgment on the merits, and as a member of the certified class, Metcalf was a party to the prior litigation. Collateral estoppel thus bars Metcalf's federal (and analogous state) constitutional claims unless application of the doctrine would work an injustice.

            We reject Metcalf's claim that the federal magistrate and the district judge did not give full consideration to the inmates' claims. Metcalf relies on State v. Frederick, 100 Wn.2d 550, 559, 674 P.2d 136 (1983), wherein our Supreme Court declined to apply collateral estoppel where the prior adjudication failed to fully consider the evidence and apply the appropriate law. In that case, the asserted "prior adjudication" was a single-sentence order refusing to consider a petitioner's personal restraint petition, concluding that it had "no basis either in fact or law and appear[ed] frivolous on its face." The Supreme Court proceeded to consider the merits. Id. at 559.

            This case differs greatly from Frederick, because here the federal court did not issue a perfunctory order. To the contrary, the claims were carefully considered and discussed. 

Even so, Metcalf concluded at 92 Wash. App. 176:

Metcalf is correct that Washington follows the rule that "an important issue of law should not be foreclosed by collateral estoppel." Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wn.2d 413, 418-19, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989) (citing Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 376, 379, 617 P.2d 713 (1980)). There can be little question as to the importance of the issues raised here, given the large numbers of inmates affected and the gravity of the challenges asserted. We therefore elect to consider the merits of Metcalf's claims. 

And Kennedy v. City of Seattle, (1980) 94 Wash. 2d. 379 found:

There are a number of requirements for the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Beagles v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 25 Wn. App. 925, 610 P.2d 962 (1980). We need consider only one: that application of the doctrine must not work an injustice. Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wn.2d 109, 119, 431 P.2d 961 (1967). It would be manifestly unjust not only to litigants Kennedy and McGuire but to other houseboat and moorage owners for the constitutionality of the houseboat ordinance to be determined by a municipal court ruling unappealed by the City.  Furthermore, the relitigation of an important public question of law such as the validity of the houseboat ordinance should not be foreclosed by collateral estoppel. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 230, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). 

Likewise, it would be manifestly unjust not only to Mr. Knight but to other noncustodial parents prosecuted for contempt and subject to orders requiring employment and the seeking of employment for the validity of such orders under the Antipeonage Act to not be considered.  There can be little question as to the importance of the issues raised here in matters of child support enforcement through contempt proceedings, and Mr. Knight’s claims under the federal Antipeonage Act, 42 U.S.C. §1994; given the large numbers of non-custodial parents affected, and the gravity of these challenges.  Any State’s claim of important interest of government support consideration on the merits of Mr. Knight’s claims under the Metcalf, Southcenter, and Kennedy doctrine.  If it is not important, then why deny noncustodial parents equal protection of Article I Section 17, Washington’s prohibition of imprisonment for debt, and use such procedures to attempt to coerce employment to pay child support?

5.  COURT OF APPEALS RECOGNIZED MR. KNIGHT’S RIGHT TO APPEAL A COMMISSIONER’S DECISION 

            On November 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals, Division I, entered an unpublished opinion in Knight v. State ex rel. et al, No. 54518-3, please see Exhibits attached to the State’s Response.  Directly on the point of Mr. Knight’s right to appeal a commissioner’s ruling the Court of Appeals found:

If the order was issued in error or because the superior court was biased against him, Knight could have appealed the order. 
 Knight has not shown that an appeal of that order was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.  The lower court, therefore,
 properly denied his request for a writ of prohibition. 

Emphasis added.  Who is right?  A three judge panel of the Court of Appeals or King County Superior Court Judge Dean Lum?  While an unpublished decision of a Court of Appeals is generally non-citable as an authority, RAP 10.4(h), Mr. Knight in this present action and in the Court of Appeals case is the SAME person.  He is entitled to rely on a court decision in a case involving himself.

            Should this Court find that Mr. Knight is somehow prohibited from appealing a Commissioner’s decision, then Mr. Knight could use the Writs Act, consistent with the recent findings of the Court of Appeals.  Such would increase the burden of litigation in this case.

6.  MR. KNIGHT’S RIGHT TO FULLY AND FAIRLY PRESENT HIS ARGUMENTS WITHOUT INTIMIDATION AND TO CONSIDERATION OF SUCH ARGUMENTS WITHOUT BIAS OR PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICER IS AFFIRMED BY THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT IN THE RECENT ADMONISHMENT OF COMMISSIONER BONNIE JEAN CANADA-THURSTON 

            Apparently, Commissioner Bonnie Jean Canada-Thurston has an imposing presence in the courtroom with a loud booming voice.  However, it is not appropriate for a judicial officer to intimidate litigants out of presenting their arguments.  The findings by the Commission in In re Canada-Thurston, CJC Proceeding No. 4389-F-120, attached as an Exhibit herein, include:

By her conduct, the Respondent created conditions such that the parties may have at times have been inhibited from fully and fairly presenting their positions. 

What purpose can there be for any request to impose sanctions and any entertainment of such request by a court other than to inhibit parties “from fully and fairly presenting their positions”?

            To impose sanctions for challenging an order requiring employment or the seeking of employment as declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994 is as offensive to the rights of litigants to fully and fairly present such position.  Indeed, to say that such requirement is not peonage is like saying that a fathom is not six feet, even in the face of evidence that the National Bureau of Standards seems to think it is.

            For these and many other reasons State’s request for sanctions should be denied.

7.  ANY AGREEMENT BY MR. KNIGHT TO THE ORDER, AND WHETHER SUCH AGREEMENT IS UNDER DURESS, IS IRRELEVANT TO WHETHER THE ORDER IS DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY 42 U.S.C. §1994

            The Antipeonage Act of 1867, 42 U.S.C. §1994.  It reads:

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void. 

Emphasis added.  The Antipeonage Act, as present and as originally passed, 14 STAT 546, is the product of a legislative process.  Why include such language “voluntary or involuntary”?  Because in New Mexico Territory, referenced by the statute at 14 STAT 546, and in similar systems as practiced elsewhere, most instances of peonage were imposed by CONTRACT, not by court order.  It was the way an unemployed person obtained a job.  An employer would loan a sum of money that could support the peon and any family he had for a month or two, and the peon agreed to be bound as the servant to the creditor until such loan is paid off.  Each month, the master would advance an additional sum of money to replace the funds the peon spent to support himself and his family.  Thus the peon would never be able to buy his way out of bondage.  This was specifically addressed by Senator Lane of Massachusetts (Actually there were two Senator Lanes serving in the 39th Congress, one from Kansas and one from Indiana, both Republicans. I am not sure which one was speaking.), recorded at Congressional Globe 39th Congress 2d. Sess. p. 1571 attached herein as an Exhibit:

where the peon has a family to support and the creditor supports him, amounts to servitude for life. 

            The employer was free to forgive such debts whenever he felt the need to lay people off.

            This was a clear imbalance of power that the 1867 Congress felt was unfair and inconsistent with our post-Civil War institutions.

            Therefore it matters not whether Mr. Knight agreed to the Order, many New Mexican peons had agreed to be peons and Congress clearly intended to include such contracts in its statutory prohibition.

8.  THE ANTIPEONAGE ACT APPLIES TO COURT ORDERS

            The Antipeonage Act of 1867, 42 U.S.C. §1994.  It reads:

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void. 

            The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, does not include the word “orders”.  This is a deliberate decision made by Congress.  That Congress has never deleted the word “orders” from the Antipeonage Act is also a deliberate decision.

            When unemployed people did not go along with this program, the courts were there, armed with vagrancy statutes, to impose peonage on the unemployed.  Whenever an employer needed more help, the local sheriff would round up the unemployed and the courts would fine them for vagrancy.  The employer would then pay the fines creating the debt which bound the vagrancy defendants to the employer as peons.  Peonage can also be imposed for any court judgment that a defendant could not pay, including judgments for breach of contract, tort, awards for attorney’s fees, AND FOR ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT.

            New Mexico’s Vagrancy Act of 1860[3] had two primary and traditional definitions of vagrancy:  1) Unemployed and without funds or property sufficient to support oneself without employment.  And 2) Abandoning family without leaving them the means for their support.  A man could be convicted of vagrancy if he has no money and no job and he is separated from his family by any distance greater perhaps than an arm’s reach.

            This is what Congress abolished with the Antipeonage Act of 1867.  Congress is authorized to pass this provision by Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 20-23, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18.  Had Congress intended to make an exception for alimony and child support, it could have easily written in such language.  Any subsequent Congress may alter the Antipeonage Act, as subsequent Congresses are not bound by the Acts of previous Congresses.  Lockhart v. United States, (December 7, 2005) 546 U.S. _____, 125 S. Ct. ____, Supreme Court of the United States No. 04-881, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion citing Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135; Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 and several other cases.  But until then, an Act of Congress is entitled to its plain meaning, Lockhart, O’Connor majority opinion, quoting Union Bank v. Wolas, (1991) 502 U.S. 151, 158, 115 L. Ed. 2d. 145, 112 S. Ct. 527:

The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.

 

9.  UNTIL CONGRESS CHANGES OR REPEALS THE ANTIPEONAGE ACT, NO STATE CAN LAWFULLY AUTHORIZE ANY VIOLATION THEREOF 

            The Antipeonage Act of 1867, 42 U.S.C. §1994.  It reads:

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void. 

Emphasis added.  Any provision of the Revised Code of Washington, or any act of the Washington Legislature or the Legislature of the Territory of Washington would be included in the words “acts, laws, resolutions” in the Antipeonage Act.  Any provision of the Washington Administrative Code would fall under the words “regulations” in the Antipeonage Act.  Any decision setting precedent by the Supreme Court of Washington or the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, and any other source of case law or common law as used by the courts of this State, would come within the word “usages” in the Antipeonage Act.  Since 1889 Washington is a state and prior to 1889 it was a territory.

            The Antipeonage Act’s Criminal Provision, 18 U.S.C. §1981 currently reads:

(a) Whoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage, or arrests any person with the intent of placing him in or returning him to a condition of peonage, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.

(b) Whoever obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be liable to the penalties prescribed in subsection (a).  

Little argument is necessary to establish that no state can authorize any of its agents, be he or she a prosecutor, a deputy sheriff, or a judicial officer, to commit a federal felony where Congress is duly authorized by the Constitution to pass such statute and such statute is not offensive to any provision of the Constitution.  The number of court opinions finding the Antipeonage Act to be unconstitutional is precisely zero.  Mr. Alzanki was convicted of this crime and the conviction upheld, United States v. Alzanki, (1st Cir. 1995) 54 F. 3d. 994.  Clyatt v. United States, (1905) 197 U.S. 207, 218, 49 L. Ed. 726, 15 S. Ct. 429 found that:

In the exercise of that power Congress has enacted these sections denouncing peonage, and punishing one who holds another in that condition of involuntary servitude.  This legislation is not limited to the territories or other parts of the strictly national domain, but is operative in the states and wherever the sovereignty of the United States extends.  We entertain no doubt of the validity of this legislation, or its applicability to the case of any person holding another in a state of peonage, and this whether there be a municipal ordinance or state law sanctioning such holding. 

Emphasis added.  “In the exercise of that power” refers to Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, “these sections denouncing peonage” refers to the Antipeonage Act.  While it is true that the conviction of Mr. Clyatt for peonage was reversed, that was because of the language of the indictment which only charged the defendants of “returning” the persons in question to a condition of peonage, which required proof that such persons were previously in such condition to which they were returned.  Had the indictment accused such defendants of attempting to place or hold any persons in a condition of peonage, then there would have been no such evidentiary requirement as these acts are also defined by the statute to be crimes.

            A United States Grand Jury could in good faith, with only the evidence of the Order in question, indict Ms. Jeske and Commissioner Sellers each of the crime defined by 18 U.S.C. §1581.  With some additional evidence, because the use of the Order to Show Cause and the bench warrants to repeatedly arrest Mr. Knight until Mr. Knight and Mr. King, his employer, and Mr. Scannell, his attorney for a while, tired of such arrests, and forced his attendance at proceedings where Ms. Jeske can present the Order in question with a take it or leave it attitude, the Grand Jury could indict all persons involved with 18 U.S.C. §1581 crimes, provided they carefully write the indictment to cover the acts in question.

            Another reason a state cannot lawfully authorize its agents or citizens to commit a federal felony is that it can expose such persons to this criminal liability.

10. STATE’S ASSERTION THAT MR. KNIGHT CAN CHOOSE HIS EMPLOYER AVOIDS VIOLATION OF THE ANTIPEONAGE ACT IS VERY, VERY, WRONG 

            On pages 6 and 7, the State finally addresses the issue of peonage.  The State asserts:

            In sum, the Respondent is not required to work or labor to pay a debt in any specific job or to any specific master or service.  He has worked in the past as an engineer for many years for the Boeing Company and has worked in the recent past for several years as a contract paralegal for a number of different local and (sic) attorneys.  He is more than capable of providing support for his children.  He simply prefers to file and present legal argument after legal argument rather than to meet the most basic needs of his children.  The Anti-Peonage Act simply does not apply to this instance . . .

 

            This issue was addressed dead on point in United States v. Reynolds, (1914) 235 U.S. 133, 146 59 L. Ed. 162, 35 S. Ct. 86:

When thus at labor, the convict is working under a contract which he has made with his surety.  He is to work until the amount which the surety has paid for him -- the sum of the fine and the costs -- is paid.  The surety has paid the state and the service is rendered to reimburse him.  That is the real substance of the transaction.  The terms of that contract are agreed upon by the contracting parties, as the result of their own negotiations.  The statute of the state does not prescribe them.  It leaves the making of the contract to the parties concerned, and this fact is not changed because of the requirement that the judge shall approve the contract.

 

Emphasis added.  By this ruling, the dismissal of the peonage indictments was reversed.  Thus, it is not fatal to a claim of peonage that the peon may choose his employer or even his profession.  The surety as contemplated in Reynolds could easily be a manufacturing concern, a restaurant, or an engineering firm, if interested in hiring someone with appropriate skills who happens to be in trouble with the law.

11.  AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH PEONAGE NEED NOT BE SUCCESSFUL TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID 

            The Antipeonage Act of 1867, 42 U.S.C. §1994.  It reads:

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void. 

Emphasis added.  The State throughout its entire Response expresses frustration that Mr. Knight has not directed his skills toward complying with the support order.  United States v. Gaskin, (1944) 320 U.S. 527, 527-528, 88 L. Ed. 287, 64 S. Ct. 318, “There was no allegation that Johnson rendered any labor or service in consequence of the arrest.”  Not necessary to prove a crime of arresting with intent to hold or return to a condition of peonage, Gaskin, at 320 U.S. 528-530.

            Pollock v. Williams, (1944) 322 U.S. 4, 16, 88 L. Ed. 1095, 64 S. Ct. 792 found:

We can conceive reasons, even if unconstitutional ones, which might lead well-intentioned persons to apply this Act as a means to make otherwise shiftless men work,  

And note 26 referenced therein reads:

            Dr. Albert Bushnell Hart in The Southern South, after reviewing and unsparingly condemning evidences of peonage in some regions, says, “Much of the peonage is simply a desperate attempt to make men earn their living.  The trouble is that nobody is wise enough to invent a method of compelling specific performance of a labor contract which shall not carry with it the principle of bondage.” 

And why compel men to earn their living?  To support any children they may have?  The trouble is that nobody is wise enough to invent a method of compelling specific performance of a support order which shall not carry with it the principle of bondage.  Ms. Jeske never even attempted such effort.  Pollock, at 322 U.S. 18 further found:

Whatever of social value there may be, and of course it is great, in enforcing contracts and collection of debts, Congress has put it beyond debate that no indebtedness warrants the suspension of the right to be free from compulsory service.  This congressional policy means that no state can make quitting of work any component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to labor. 

Or to otherwise enforce with the threat of imprisonment, which is contained in the Order.

12.  THE ANTIPEONAGE ACT DECLARES ORDERS IMPOSING PEONAGE TO BE NULL AND VOID; SUCH IS AUTHORIZED BY THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT; IF SUCH REQUIRES A COLLATERAL ATTACK AGAINST SUCH ORDERS, SUCH IS AUTHORIZED BY 42 U.S.C. §1994 

            On page 7 of the State’s Response is the following assertion:

The Anti-Peonage Act simply does not apply to this instance and even if it did, this would constitute a collateral attack upon the support order which has been in effect since 1991. 

            The Antipeonage Act of 1867, 42 U.S.C. §1994.  It reads:

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void. 

On March 2, 1867, there were numerous orders of New Mexico courts and numerous peonage contracts in force in New Mexico Territory.  On that day, with the signature of President Andrew Johnson, these court orders and contracts became null and void.  The underlying debts were not extinguished, but the requirement for service or labor of such debtors and the enforcement of such requirements for service or labor were declared null and void.

            Some of these orders were as much as 30 years old and still being enforced.  The new statute was a collateral attack on these pre-existing court orders and contracts.  Mr. Knight has never found, and the State does not cite, any court decisions finding that this was not within the power granted to Congress by Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.

            Because such orders are declared null and void, they cannot bear any preclusive value, and are subject to direct, collateral, or any other kind of attack on the grounds that they are declared null and void by the Antipeonage Act.

13.  CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated herein, this Motion for Revision of Commissioner’s Order should be granted and the Order entered on November 10, 2005 should be modified to eliminate the requirement to seek or maintain employment and bring proof of such employment efforts on the grounds that such an order is declared null and void by the Antipeonage Act, 42 U.S.C. §1994.

14.  PROPOSED ORDER

            A copy of the proposed Order will be supplied.

Respectfully submitted, December 9, 2005,

 

                                                            ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, pro se

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[3] Vagrancy Act of 1860, New Mexico Territory, official English language version (Laws of New Mexico Territory were officially enacted in both Spanish and English):  Section 11: “The following described persons shall be considered vagrants: (2)(d) Persons who shall have abandoned their families, leaving them without the means of support.  Section 14: . . . and in the case the accused shall be found guilty of vagrancy, it shall be the duty of the probate judge to confine him or her, as the case may be, in jail for the term of twenty days, unless he shall give bond to the Territory, with one or more securities, to be approved by the probate judge, in the sum of at least one hundred dollars, conditioned for his or her good conduct for the term of one year; and if during the year the accused shall commit any act of vagrancy or any crime or misdemeanor, the person under bond shall be subject to a fine; and if he shall have a family, such fine shall, when collected, be applied to the support thereof, or the support of any other person who by law he is compelled to maintain; and in case he shall be sold as hereinafter provided.”