I. IDENTITY OF THE MOVING PARTY
Roger W. Knight, appellant.
Review
of the unpublished opinion entered in the
Court of Appeals, Division One on
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Did
the Court of Appeals err in its confirmation of the findings by the
superior
court,
Order on Civil Motion, CP 126-128, that an order,
Order on
Contempt, Sub No. 199, CP 1-5, requiring 30 hours of work per week or 3 job contacts to enable payment
of past due child support or be confined in a county jail is not declared null
and void by the Antipeonage Act,
42 U.S.C. §1994?
B. Did
the Court of Appeals err in its confirmation of the findings by the
superior
court, that the
Motion to Modify Commissioner’s Order, Sub No. 203, CP 6-13,
raised a frivolous issue and was frivolous, imposing an award for sanctions in
the amount of $900.00?
IV STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On
On
On
On
On
V. ARGUMENT
A.
RAP
13.4(b) Considerations
RAP 13.4(b) provides four criteria for consideration by
this Court of Review of a court of appeals decision. The reasons this Court granted review in
Amunrud v. Department of Social and Health
Services, No. 76590-1 and deferred review in Mr. Knight’s challenge to the
license suspension provisions of the WorkFirst Act,
RCW 74.20A.320,
Knight v. State of Washington, Department of
Social and Health Services, No. 77063-8 pending Amunrud v. DSHS are even more compelling for granting review in
this present petition.
Though this case involves a claim that the
court order in
question is declared null and void by an Act of Congress, the Antipeonage Act,
as originally passed on
March 2, 1867, 14 STAT 546, and as presently codified
under a few Congressional amendments increasing the penalty for the crime
since, 18 U.S.C. §1581 and
42 U.S.C. §1994, it still implies the criteria of
RAP 13.4(b)(3). The Antipeonage Act was
found to be authorized by
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment in
Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3,
20-23, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18 and in every published opinion since
considering such validity. The Antipeonage
Act has never been found unconstitutional, including by the
superior court and
by the Court of Appeals, and the State never made such claim in this case.
Yet the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Knight’s challenge to
the order requiring employment or the seeking of employment in liquidation of a
child support debt or obligation under explicit threat of imprisonment as
declared null and void by
42 U.S.C. §1994 and declared Mr. Knight motion
“wholly frivolous”.
It is like finding that the ocean is not salty and
declaring such claim to be “wholly frivolous”.
The question of constitutional implications is the
authority of Congress to prohibit peonage, including in cases where the duty to
support a child is the debt or obligation, granted by
Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment. As set forth in
Mr. Knight’s Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 2-4, submitted to the
Court of
Appeals in the case, No. 57547-3-I, below:
Mr. Knight is not relying solely on the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. He is relying on the Antipeonage Act, a statute that has never been found to be unconstitutional and has always been found to be within the grant of authority to enforce the prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude set forth in Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Even if the Thirteenth Amendment can be read as not restricting requirements to serve on jury duty[1], military service, road work[2], or merchant marine, Congress is authorized to pass appropriate legislation to restrict or prohibit mandatory service for such obligations. Congress abolished the draft. Congress can regulate merchant marine contracts to avoid involuntary servitude, including criminal penalties and civil action for redress for off-shore peonage, and repeal the statute at issue in Robertson v. Baldwin, (1897) 165 U.S. 275, 41 L. Ed. 715, 17 S. Ct. 326.
Congress has the authority under the Appropriate Legislation
Clauses to go beyond the protections contemplated by the Civil War Amendments
to implement these Amendments:
Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer, Co., (1968) 392 U.S. 409, 413, 437-444, 20 L. Ed. 2d.
1189, 88
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to the end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and the spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
Simply put, if Congress
has the constitutional authority to prohibit peonage in liquidation of a child
support debt or obligation, and has done so, then it matters not
what interests of government there are for compelling labor in liquidation of
such debt or obligation. Government can
claim similar interests in the enforcement of any other debt or obligation. However, the elected Congress has the
authority to choose prohibiting involuntary servitude in liquidation of any
debt or obligation as the higher interest of government, and it has done so.
As to the criteria of
RAP 13.4(b)(4), this is clearly an
issue of substantial public interest.
There are numerous orders similar to the the
Order on Contempt, Sub
No. 199, CP 1-5, in that they require 3, 5, 10 or more job contacts each week
or at least 30 hours or other specific number of hours of work each week,
affecting a large number of people. If
child support and enforcing child support and the validity of laws and methods
of enforcing child support are not important, then why deny parents ordered to
pay child support equal protection of
Article I Section 17 of the
Washington
Constitution and use the threat of imprisonment to impose orders requiring job
searches or work?
B.
Court of
Appeals Unpublished Opinion is Irrational
Page 2 of the
Unpublished Opinion reads in part:
Knight has
already repeatedly raised this exact issue in state and federal courts.
Not true. The issue Mr. Knight raised herein is whether
a court order requiring 30 hours of work per week or three job contacts is
declared null and void by
42 U.S.C. §1994.
He could not have raised this issue at any time prior to
He has never prevailed.
Again, not true. As stated in his
Brief of Appellant, p. 31,
submitted to the Court of Appeals in the case, No. 57547-3-I, below:
Mr. Knight prevailed
in the criminal DWLS cases after Judge
Michael Trickey
reversed the DWLS
convictions on the basis that service required by
RCW 74.20A.320(1) had to be
proved.
City of
And in Note 12 on that
page, Mr. Knight informed the Court of Appeals:
Reversing convictions in
City of Mercer Island v. Knight, King
County District Court, Bellevue Division Nos. MIC 84199 and MIC 84268,
dismissed with prejudice on remand.
Other criminal DWLS prosecutions:
City
of Seattle v. Knight, Seattle Municipal Court No. 415256, dismissed with
prejudice; State v. Knight, King
County District Court, South Division No. CQ54646KC, dismissed with prejudice;
and State v. Knight, King County
District Court, West Division, No. C438381,
dismissed without prejudice after
one year limitation,
RCW 9A.04.080(1)(j), expired.
Most people would call
that “prevailing”.
The Court of Appeals
goes on to state:
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held in at
least two unpublished opinions that the
Which unpublished
opinions? Which
Unpublished dispositions and orders of
this Court are
not binding precedent, except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Thus not binding
precedent as to whether any statute violates the Antipeonage Act.
The
unpublished opinion goes on to find:
Judge
Robert Lasnik of the
United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington has ordered that, as the result of
his vexatious and frivolous litigation, Knight may not file any pro se
complaint or petition in that court in any case where he is a named plaintiff
or purports to act as party representative without prior review by
the court.
That would be
Document
No. 65, Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment, in
Knight v. City of Mercer Island et al, W.D. Wash No. C02-879L and
the Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment, Document No. 77 in that
case.
The issues Mr. Knight raised in
federal court are almost
identical to the issues he has raised in this Court in his
Petition for Review
in No. 77063-8, which this Court has deferred pending the Amunrud case. Mr. Knight
raised issues similar to
Amunrud in
the federal court. The reasons he was
“repeatedly” raising these issues in federal court are as follows:
In 2001, Corey E. Legge made a service attempt of license
suspension paperwork on Mr. Knight that was unsuccessful. On
Mr. Knight found out when police started pulling him
over, impounding his car, and citing him for Driving While License Suspended
3rd degree. The
City of
The Antipeonage Act issue in Mr. Knight’s challenge to
the WorkFirst Act is that license suspension, as part of a continuum of
measures taken to enforce support orders, constitutes the “plausible
compulsion” found by
United
States v. Kozminski, (1988) 487 U.S. 931, 952, 101 L. Ed. 2d. 788, 108
The
Order on Contempt, Sub No. 199, CP 1-5, requiring 30 hours of work per week
or 3 job contacts is simply an entirely different issue when it comes to
proving the element of “plausible compulsion” that proves involuntary servitude
and peonage.
C. As to Whether an Antipeonage Act
Challenge to Child Support
is Frivolous,
California Supreme Court; as
California’s Finding Follows
Neitzke
This Court Should Side With
Child
Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, (2005) 109
However, the
Neither a
D. As to Whether Choice of Employer
Defeats Claim of Peonage,
Conflict With
Court of New Mexico Territory;
and Renders Antipeonage Act
a Nullity
While disagreeing with California’s finding that Brent
Moss relied in good faith on the Antipeonage Act,
Doe at 125 P. 3d. 473 relied on
Moss’
finding that:
In
Moss,
the court noted that "[t]he obligation of a parent to support a child . .
. is among the most fundamental obligations recognized by modern society"
and "to become employed if that is necessary to meet the obligation, is in
no way comparable or akin to peonage or slavery."
When, as here, however, the person claiming involuntary servitude is simply expected to seek and accept employment, if available, and is free to choose the type of employment and the employer, and is also free to resign that employment if the conditions are unsatisfactory or to accept other employment, none of the aspects of "involuntary servitude" which invoke the need to apply a contextual approach to Thirteenth Amendment analysis are present. There is no "servitude" since the worker is not bound to any particular employer and has no restrictions on his freedom other than the need to comply with a lawful order to support a child. Working to earn money to support a child is not involuntary servitude any more than working in order to pay taxes. Failure to do either may subject one to civil and criminal penalties, but that compulsion or incentive to labor does not create a condition of involuntary servitude.
Of course it is
axiomatic, by definition, that any peon can escape the condition by paying off
the debt, or by finding a lender or employer willing to purchase the debt, or
by finding and alternative employer willing to pay a salary sufficient to allow
payments toward the debt. Absent such
fortunate circumstances, we have the precise evil addressed by the
Thirteenth
Amendment and the Antipeonage Act.
Without the alternative employer, the noncustodial parent is NOT FREE “to resign
that employment if the conditions are unsatisfactory”.
Moss
is as irrational as finding that a person stranded in a life raft without fresh
water in the middle of the ocean is free to magically transport himself to
another location with better conditions, therefore his life is not in danger.
Moss and
Doe render the Antipeonage Act a
nullity. This is not what Congress
intended in 1867 and such interpretation flies in the face of the rules for
statutory construction of Acts of Congress as defined by the
United States
Supreme Court in numerous decisions since 1787.
As pled in the
Brief of Appellant
below at p. 13:
The Antipeonage Act, as present,
42 U.S.C. §1994, and as originally passed,
14 STAT 546, includes the language
“voluntary or involuntary”. In
And at pp. 18-19:
Addressed on point in
Reynolds, supra, at 235
When thus at labor, the convict is working under a
contract which he has made with his surety.
He is to work until the amount which the surety has paid for him -- the
sum of the fine and the costs -- is paid.
The surety has paid the state and the service is rendered to reimburse
him. That is the real substance of the
transaction. The terms of that contract are agreed upon by the contracting parties,
as the result of their own negotiations.
The statute of the state does not prescribe them. It leaves the making of the contract to the
parties concerned, and this fact is not changed because of the requirement that
the judge shall approve the contract.
Emphasis added. Peonage Cases, supra, at 123 F. 674 found:
If the peon wished to change the masters or service, he could find a new employer who would advance enough to pay the peon’s debts to his then master, and the peon would then become bound in the new employer’s service.
Same, Jaremillo, supra, at 1 N.M. 194, and:
If the servant does not wish to continue in service for any cause, such as the ill-treatment of the master, and receiving better pay from another;
Reynolds is
United States v. Reynolds, (1914) 235
For
the reasons stated herein, this Court should grant review of the
Unpublished Decision
entered on
Respectfully submitted, this 29th day of August, 2006.
____________________________________
Roger W. Knight, pro se
[1] Excuse from jury duty is easily obtained.
[2] Corvee labor not necessary since the per gallon fuel tax pays the wages of those who voluntarily choose road work for a vocation.
[3]
Younger v. Harris, (1971) 401
