I. IDENTITY
OF THE MOVING PARTY
Roger W. Knight, appellant.
Review
of the unpublished opinion entered in the
Court of Appeals, Division One on
III. ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Did
the Court of Appeals err in its findings that the previous federal court cases
cited by the State had preclusive effect on the claims stated by Mr.
Knight? Specifically that the
federal
district court found itself precluded, in both cases, by
Younger[1]
abstention doctrine and by
Rooker-Feldman[2]
doctrine and that the State failed to provide evidence sufficient to meet its
burden of proof that the federal cases were preclusive? Did the Court of Appeals thus err in failing
to determine the issues thus found to be precluded: that Laws 1997 chapter 58,
the WorkFirst Act, which added
RCW 74.20A.320 et seq. providing for the suspension of licenses solely on the
basis of failure to pay child support is (1) an
unconstitutional ex post facto law; (2) violates due process and equal
protection in violation of the state and federal constitutions; (3) a bill of
attainder; (4) a multi-subject bill in violation of the
state constitution; and
(5) a violation of the federal Anti-Peonage Act?
B. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that
City of Redmond v. Moore, (2004) 151 Wash.
2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 did not constitute a change in law preventing application
of preclusion of prior court findings, and are the findings by the
Court of
Appeals in
Amunrud
v. Board of Appeals, (2004) ____Wash. App.
_____, 103 P. 3d 257 in error as contradiction of
Redmond v. Moore?
C. Did
the Court of Appeals err in not ruling on whether the State, had the
jurisdiction to suspend a license absent a modification of a support order
pre-existing the WorkFirst Act to include a provision for license suspension? Did the Court of Appeals err in not
considering whether under the
Smith
and
Cruz test[3],
the Legislature failed to specify that the WorkFirst Act affected pre-existing
support orders?
IV STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
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V. ARGUMENT
A.
RAP 13.4(b) Considerations
RAP 13.4(b) provides four criteria for consideration by
this Court of Review of a
court of appeals decision. Obviously, a claim arising under
Redmond v. Moore, considering due
process of law, involves the third of these criteria,
RAP 13.4(b)(3) as both
the United States Constitution, with its
Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Washington Constitution, with its
Article I Section 3, mandate due process of
law.
Also obviously, the claims found to be precluded by the
previous federal court cases also meets the criterion of
RAP 13.4(b)(3), as
they involve claims of violation of the United States Constitution and the
Washington Constitution.
It is also clear, that the
Court of
Appeals findings in
Amunrud, and by
extension, in Knight below, are in
conflict with
Redmond v. Moore, therefore,
meeting the first criterion of
RAP 13.4(b)(1).
The other claims that Mr. Knight
makes as to the constitutionality of the WorkFirst Act, also involve claims of
conflict with decisions of this Court.
Particularly Mr. Knight’s claim that Laws 1997 chapter 58 is a
multi-subject bill prohibited by
Article II Section 19 of the
Washington
Constitution. This issue was decided by
Division Two of the Court of Appeals in
Bennett v. State,
(2003) 117
Therefore, this issue of multi-subject bill meets both
RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (3) criteria.
The issues of jurisdiction of the State and its agency
the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) to suspend a license absent
any modification of a pre-existing support order and the
Smith and
Cruz test
issues also go to due process of law, criterion
RAP 13.4(b)(3).
All issues involving child support, licensing, and
constitutionality of statutes and the government procedure in implementing such
statutes are issues of substantial public interest that should be decided by
this Court. Thus meeting the criterion
of
RAP 13.4(b)(4).
If not, then why suspend licenses for nonpayment of child
support?
B.
Amunrud
and
Knight Conflicts with
In its
amicus brief DOL claims it will incur significant fiscal and administrative
burdens if it is required to provide an administrative hearing for drivers who
receive suspension notices under
RCW 46.20.289.
The
potential cost to the State is not proved on this record, although
DOL alleges
that providing an opportunity for such a hearing would increase its workload
and mandate the hiring of additional staff to process the hearings. While this may be true, the burden on the
State is worthy of consideration but in itself not controlling. We are not persuaded that the burden of
providing hearings to those individuals whose licenses have been ordered
suspended under RCW 46.20.289 outweighs the risk of error and the benefit of
providing hearings with DOL to correct potential ministerial errors.
Therefore
we hold RCW 46.20.289 and
.324(1) are contrary to the guaranty of due process
because they do not provide adequate procedural safeguards to ensure against
the erroneous deprivation of a driver's interest in the continued use and
possession of his or her driver's license.
Mr.
Knight's license was suspended pursuant to
RCW 46.20.324(1) upon certification
by the DSHS of noncompliance with a support order. This certification was issued on
The fatal
flaw in the Court of Appeals’ findings in
Amunrud
and the case below is that the
RCW 74.20A.320(13) hearing is clearly analogous
to the hearing in a COURT that any
person charged with a traffic infraction may go to for adjudicating the notice
of infraction. In a challenge to a
notice of infraction, the court is not arbitrarily prohibited from considering
any issue raised by an infraction defendant, including whether the statute in
question is constitutional.
Nevertheless, this Court found in
But
RCW 74.20A.320(3) prohibits
consideration by the administrative hearing of ability to comply with the
support order, or any other issue than whether the person named as the
responsible parent is the responsible parent; required to pay child support
under a child support order; and whether he is in compliance with the order. Therefore, the remedies available to
noncustodial parents unable to comply with their support orders are LESS than the remedies available to
those subject to license suspension for failure to pay fines assessed for
traffic infractions.
Which this
Court found to be
insufficient to meet the constitutional requirement for due process of law.
The
Court of Appeals, in both
Amunrud, and
the case below, found that
the remedy of modification of a child support order to also be sufficient to
meet the due process criteria where the noncustodial parent claims inability to
comply with the support order and to pay the arrears.
RCW 74.20A.320(11) provides for a stay of
suspension by the DSHS for up to six months if “there is a reasonable
likelihood that a pending motion or request will significantly change the
amount of the child support obligation.”
The problem with this is that if there is a significant arrearage, as
there will be in all cases where the DSHS commences the license suspension
process, there will be no such reasonable likelyhood of any such change in the
amount of the child support obligation.
RCW 26.09.170(1) flat prohibits any court or administrative agency from
modifying a child support order for any month prior to the filing of such a
motion. No matter what reason or
argument the noncustodial parent may submit for relief from such child support
judgment, however compelling or required by law, the Legislature has
arbitrarily decreed that no such relief is available. Thus a modification, while it may reduce the
rate of support payable per FUTURE
month, it cannot provide any relief from a substantial arrearage that may have
built up while the noncustodial parent has been unable to comply.
At least a person may obtain relief
from a traffic infraction judgment under
CrRLJ 7.8! Relief is available from ordinary civil
judgments under
CR 60. But not child
support judgments.
As
a result of this suspension, Mr. Knight has endured five criminal prosecutions
for DWLS.[4] Mr. Knight defeated these criminal
prosecutions primarily because Judge
Michael Trickey found that the prosecutor
must prove service required by
RCW 74.20A.320(1) and
reversed two DWLS
convictions.
City of
A challenge to the validity of the statutory scheme could have been litigated much earlier in a superior court appeal of such a DOL hearing, WITHOUT preclusion by the federal cases brought as part of Mr. Knight’s defense of these DWLS charges.
While service
as required by RCW 74.20A.320(1) was accomplished on
RCW 46.20.324(1) has already been found facially unconstitutional. RCW 74.20A.320 is facially unconstitutional for the same reasons Moore found RCW 46.20.289 facially unconstitutional, and that is where the Court of Appeals conflicts with this Court’s findings in Redmond v. Moore.
For
the reasons stated herein, this Court should grant review of the
unpublished decision
entered on
Respectfully submitted, this 12th day of April, 2005.
____________________________________
Roger W. Knight, pro se
[2]
Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., (1923) 263
[3]
State v. Smith,
(2001) 144
[4]
City of
