I.          AS TO THE STATE’S RESTATEMENT OF THE

            ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

 

            As the State has not filed any cross appeal, Mr. Knight’s Assignments of Error set forth on page 1 of his Brief of Appellant stand without modification.  Fosmo v. State Dept. of Personnel, (2002) 114 Wash. App. 537, 539 note 2, 59 P. 3d. 105 citing Robinson v. Khan, (1998) 89 Wash. App. 418, 420 note 1, 948 P. 2d. 1347 citing Philips Building Co. v. An, (1996) 81 Wash. App. 696, 700 note 3, 915 P. 2d. 1146, which cited Nord v. Phipps, (1977) 18 Wash. App. 262, 266 note 3, 566 P. 2d. 1294 citing Waagen v. Gerde, (1950) 36 Wash. 2d. 563, 219 P. 2d. 595 and Leland v. Frogge, (1967) 71 Wash. 2d. 197, 427 P. 2d. 724.

II.        AS TO THE STATE’S RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

            PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

 

            As the State has not filed any cross appeal, Mr. Knight’s Issues Pertaining to Assignments of Error set forth on pages 1-3 of his Brief of Appellant stand without modification.  Fosmo, supra.

III        AS TO THE STATE’S RESTATEMENT OF THE CASE

            Most of the incidents set forth in the State’s Restatement of the Case are irrelevant to the issues raised in this appeal.

IV        AS TO THE STATE’S ARGUMENT

A)        State’s Position.

            The State’s position is set forth in the title to its Part 1 of its Argument:

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION TO MODIFY AS THE COURT MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPOSE CIVIL CONTEMPT SANCTIONS, INCLUDING IMPRISONMENT, ON A PARENT WHO WILLFULLY FAILS TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT

 

B)        Knight’s Position: Antipeonage Act is Constitutional and

            Authorized by Thirteenth Amendment and Even if Thirteenth

            Amendment Does Not Prohibit Court Orders to be Employed

            to Pay Child Support, the Antipeonage Act Prohibits Such

            Orders

 

            Mr. Knight is not relying solely on the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.  He is relying on the Antipeonage Act, a statute that has never been found to be unconstitutional and has always been found to be within the grant of authority to enforce the prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude set forth in Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Even if the Thirteenth Amendment can be read as not restricting requirements to serve on jury duty[1], military service, road work[2], or merchant marine, Congress is authorized to pass appropriate legislation to restrict or prohibit mandatory service for such obligations.  Congress abolished the draft.  Congress can regulate merchant marine contracts to avoid involuntary servitude, including criminal penalties and civil action for redress for off-shore peonage, and repeal the statute at issue in Robertson v. Baldwin, (1897) 165 U.S. 275, 41 L. Ed. 715, 17 S. Ct. 326.

            Congress has the authority under the Appropriate Legislation Clauses to go beyond the protections contemplated by the Civil War Amendments to implement these Amendments: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., (1968) 392 U.S. 409, 413, 437-444, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 1189, 88 S. Ct. 2186 and Griffin v. Breckenridge, (1971) 403 U.S. 88, 105, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 338, 91 S. Ct. 1790, Thirteenth Amendment Section 2; Katzenbach v. Morgan, (1966) 384 U.S. 641, 648-651, 16 L. Ed. 2d. 828, 86 S. Ct. 1717, Fourteenth Amendment Section 5; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, (1966) 383 U.S. 301, 15 L. Ed. 2d. 769, 86 S. Ct. 803, Fifteenth Amendment Section 2.  South Carolina and Morgan cited McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421, 4 L. Ed. 579 in setting the limits of Congressional power to implement and enforce the Civil War Amendments:

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to the end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and the spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.

 

Within this rule, the Antipeonage Act is found to be within the authorization of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 20-23, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18.

C)        State Relies on Three Published Opinions

            The State relies on three recent decisions to support its proposition that the Antipeonage Act does not prohibit the Order on Contempt, Sub No. 199, CP 1-5, where it requires 30 hours per week of employment or 3 job contacts per week: Moss v. Superior Court of Riverside County, (1998) 17 Cal Rptr. 2d 215, 17 Cal 4th 396, 950 P. 2d. 59 (Moss CSC); United States v. Ballek, (9th Cir. 1999) 170 F. 3d. 871; and Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, (2005) 109 Hawaii 240, 125 P. 3d. 461.

            Ballek ruled on a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to a criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §228 raised for the first time on appeal, but did not consider whether the Alaska state court order in question was declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994.  18 U.S.C. §228 requires that the state court child support order be “valid”.

            Moss CSC affirmed the California Court of Appeals annullment of the contempt, Moss v. Superior Court, (1996) 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 864 (Moss CCA) while reversing the findings as to the Thirteenth Amendment and the Antipeonage Act, Moss CCA at 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 868-870.

            Doe cited Moss CSC and Ballek to support its conclusion that the Antipeonage Act is not violated by the support order in question and went on to find the challenge frivolous.  As to frivolousness, it disagreed with Moss CSC which at 950 P. 2d. 80 found that Moss relied in good faith on the protection of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Antipeonage Act, and thereby affirmed the annullment of the contempt by Moss CCA.  Moss CCA not only found the Thirteenth Amendment and Antipeonage Act issues not frivolous, but also found these issues meritorious, at 56 Cal Rptr 868-870.  Ballek at 170 F. 3d. 873 note 1 considered that because the Thirteenth Amendment challenge is a purely legal issue, it overlooked Ballek’s waiver of the issue.  Ballek did not find the issue frivolous.

D)        Moss and Doe Wrongly Decided

 

            Doe at 125 P. 3d. 473 quoted Moss CSC as follows:

      In Moss, the court noted that "[t]he obligation of a parent to support a child . . . is among the most fundamental obligations recognized by modern society" and "to become employed if that is necessary to meet the obligation, is in no way comparable or akin to peonage or slavery." Id. at 67. The court distinguished the child support obligation from involuntary servitude on the grounds that the obligee is free to choose his employment and employer:

When, as here, however, the person claiming involuntary servitude is simply expected to seek and accept employment, if available, and is free to choose the type of employment and the employer, and is also free to resign that employment if the conditions are unsatisfactory or to accept other employment, none of the aspects of "involuntary servitude" which invoke the need to apply a contextual approach to Thirteenth Amendment analysis are present. There is no "servitude" since the worker is not bound to any particular employer and has no restrictions on his freedom other than the need to comply with a lawful order to support a child. Working to earn money to support a child is not involuntary servitude any more than working in order to pay taxes. Failure to do either may subject one to civil and criminal penalties, but that compulsion or incentive to labor does not create a condition of involuntary servitude.

Id. at 72. The court held that the obligation to comply with a child support order and to work if necessary to do so does not constitute involuntary servitude. Moss, 950 P.2d at 73.

 

If a court were to find that a pint of milk into which is dissolved a lethal quantity of strychnine is nevertheless safe to drink on the grounds that the good of the milk outweighs the bad of the strychnine, most people would recognize the error of such ruling.  Here, Doe quotes Moss CSC and accepts an obviously false and contradictory statement of fact:

and is also free to resign that employment if the conditions are unsatisfactory

 

Which of course is true only if the Thirteenth Amendment and the Antipeonage Act are respected and enforced, which the Moss CSC and Doe courts refused to do.  Where a party is subject to contempt proceedings, arrest and imprisonment if he were “to resign that employment if the conditions are unsatisfactory”, that is the definition of involuntary servitude.  The party may resign ONLY if he has another job lined up or has an independent source of wealth from which to pay the child support ordered.  Absent such fortunate circumstances, we have the evil addressed by the Thirteenth Amendment and the Antipeonage Act.

            Doe does not quote Moss CSC’s consideration of the legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Antipeonage Act:

      The debate on the Antipeonage Act of March 2, 1867, again suggests that involuntary servitude was understood at the time the Thirteenth Amendment was passed to refer to compelled service such as that required under an apprenticeship. Peonage was considered to be a form of involuntary servitude. (1 Schwartz, supra, at p. 167; see also Clyatt v. United States, supra, 197 U.S. at p. 215 ["But peonage, however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude."].) "The essential difference between the terms [involuntary servitude and peonage] is that peonage requires the additional element of indebtedness." (Shapiro, supra, 19 Rutgers L.J. at p. 73, original italics.) The Antipeonage Act was made necessary by the continuation of a system of peonage inherited from Spanish rule in the Territory of New Mexico and a practice of forced labor by Native Americans. (Ibid.) When Representative Bingham moved passage of the bill in the House of Representatives he explained that it would invalidate all state and territorial laws which "establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the involuntary or involuntary service of labor of any persons as peons in liquidation of any debt or obligation." (Id. at p. 171; see also Brodie, The Federally Secured Right to be Free from Bondage (1952) 40 Geo.L.J. 367, 376-377.)

 

Moss CSC at 950 P. 2d. 70-71.  No citation or quotation of Jaremillo v. Romero, (1857) 1 N.M. (Gildersleeve) 190 or the language of New Mexico’s Master and Servant Act which governed the practice of peonage.

            The rule of federal statutory construction:

“Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”

 

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., (1982) 458 U.S. 564, 570, 73 L. Ed. 2d. 973, 102 S. Ct. 3245 and Brief of Appellant pages 24-27, is modified only to the following extent:

Nevertheless, in rare cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling. We have reserved "some `scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that meaning . . . would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.'" Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571, 85 S.Ct. 562, 14 L. Ed. 2d. 75 (1965) (quoting Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510 -511, 61 S. Ct. 368, 85 L. Ed. 303 (1941)).

 

Griffin at 458 U. S. 571.  42 U.S.C. §1994 includes the phrase: “debt or obligation, or otherwise”.  The literal interpretation of this language is that the Antipeonage Act prohibits enforcing the duty to support a child by means that coerce or require employment.  Rather than search for evidence that this result is at odds with the drafters in 1867, Moss CSC concludes:

      As the authorities reviewed above demonstrate, the court's approach in cases of alleged involuntary servitude has been contextual. No single definition of the term has evolved and each situation must be examined to determine if it bears the indices of peonage or slavery. To date however, neither the Supreme Court nor any state court that has enforced a child support order has suggested that undertaking gainful employment in order to avoid sanctions for violation of a valid child support order is analogous to the peonage or involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Employment chosen by the employee which the employee is free to leave either in favor of another employer or if the working conditions are objectively intolerable, is simply not "akin to peonage." It does not become so because a person would prefer not to work but must do so in order to comply with a legal duty to support the person's children. As the court said in Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist., supra, 73 F.3d at page 459: "In application, courts have consistently found the involuntary servitude standard is not so rigorous as to prohibit all forms of labor that one person is compelled to perform for the benefit of another. The Thirteenth Amendment does not bar labor that an individual may, at least in some sense, choose not to perform, even where the consequences of that choice are 'exceedingly bad.' "

 

Moss CSC at 950 P. 2d. 71-72.  Such as threat or fact of legal process, arrest, and imprisonment?  Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist., supra, is Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist., (2d Cir. 1996) 73 F.3d 454, which involved a community service requirement for high school graduation.  Such a requirement can be lawfully avoided by either dropping out of the high school or transferring to another high school or to a program to obtain the equivalent of a high school diploma.  The Rye Neck School District was certainly not threatening any of its students with contempt proceedings, arrest, and imprisonment.

            The primary error made in Moss CSC and repeated in Doe is the search for previous court decisions finding child support enforcement through coercion of employment constitutes involuntary servitude or peonage and not finding any, rather than, pursuant to the well established rules of federal statutory construction, search for evidence that the literal interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §1994, which is clearly that coercion or requirement of employment to pay child support is declared null and void, is at odds with the intent of the Antipeonage Act’s drafters.  No such evidence is found and can be found.

            Why else did the California Supreme Court not consider Jaremillo and the historical Antipeonage Act decisions that rely on Jaremillo for a definition of what peonage is?  Moss CSC at 950 P. 2d. 73 observed:

      Brent relies on Todd, Brown, Jennings, and Pollock, but he does not acknowledge that neither Pollock nor any other Supreme Court decision holds that a condition of involuntary servitude exists when a person is free to choose and to leave the service of his or her employer, and is bound only to seek and accept employment when necessary to enable that person to fulfill a parental child support obligation.

 

            “Brent” is Brent Moss, the party.  “Todd” is Ex parte Todd, (1897) 119 Cal. 57, 50 P. 1071. “Brown” is In re Brown (1955) 136 Cal. App. 2d 40. “Jennings” is In re Jennings (1982) 133 Cal. App. 3d 373, “Pollock” is Pollock v. Williams, (1944) 322 U.S. 4, 88 L. Ed. 1095, 64 S. Ct. 792.  Apparently Moss and his attorneys did not plead Jaremillo, New Mexico Territory’s Master and Servant Act of 1851; Peonage Cases, (M.D. Ala. 1903) 123 F. 671, and make the argument Mr. Knight makes in his Brief of Appellant pages 17-22, 27-29.

            Neither Moss CSC, Doe, nor the State’s Brief of Respondent address the argument set forth by Mr. Knight that choice of employer does not defeat claim of peonage[3] and his reliance on Jaremillo, United States v. Reynolds, (1914) 235 U.S. 133, 146, 59 L. Ed. 162, 35 S. Ct. 86[4], Peonage Cases, and New Mexico Territory’s Master and Servant Act to support this argument.

            Therefore, this argument is conceded.  This Court must find that Moss CSC and Doe are wrongly decided and the employment requirements of the Order on Contempt, Sub No. 199, CP 1-5[5] are declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994.  However compelling that state’s interest in the support of its children may be, Congress has the right to prohibit peonage in the enforcement of such obligation under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and it has done so with 42 U.S.C. §1994.

E)        State’s Enforcement of the Duty to Support Child is Limited

            by the Parent’s Fourteenth Amendment Right to Determine

            Custody, Care, and Education of the Child Beyond the Troxel

            Minimum

 

            The State spends much of its Brief of Respondent emphasizing the State’s interest in the enforcement of child support.  While Congress has the authority under Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 to prohibit peonage in the enforcement of this obligation regardless of nature of the State’s interest, and has done so, this State’s interest is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment as found by Troxel v. Granville, (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 147 L. Ed. 2d. 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054:

      The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” We have long recognized that the Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, “guarantees more than fair process.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 138 L. Ed. 2d. 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). The Clause also includes a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 123 L. Ed. 2d. 1, 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993).

      The liberty interest at issue in this case–the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children–is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923), we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.” Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925), we again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” We explained in Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Id., at 535. We returned to the subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L. Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id., at 166.

      In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 31 L. Ed. 2d. 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972) (“It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements’ ” (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d. 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 54 L. Ed. 2d. 511, 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d. 101, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d. 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982) (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t] … to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children” (citing Meyer and Pierce)). In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.

 

and concluded at 530 U.S. 68-69:

Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.

 

This is the definition of the Troxel minimum.  To impose a child support order that goes beyond the amount necessary to allow the custodial parent to “adequately care[s] for his or her children” is to offend the noncustodial parent’s fundamental right to determine how much money to spend beyond the necessary requirements on the upbringing of his children.  As an example of this doctrine, as long as public schools are available, no authority can Constitutionally require any parent to take on the expense of private school tuition merely because he could afford to.[6]

            That noncustodial parents also have fundamental Fourteenth Amendment and Article I Section 3 of the Washington Constitution rights to make decisions relevant to the custody and care of their children was found by this Court in In re Marriage of Parker, (1998) 91 Wash. App. 219, 224, 957 P. 2d. 256:

Finally, the order, which effectively makes submission to the test a precondition to unsupervised visitation, affects Delmas' fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his son.

 

            In this present case Mr. Knight’s children are now grown, and what we are dealing with presently is a monetary debt and not an ongoing duty to support minor children.  Any present enforcement of the support order is violating Mr. Knight’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent such enforcement exceeds the Troxel minimum.  That the children are grown proves the unpaid support money was unnecessary for their basic needs.  State Ex. Rel. Daly v. Snyder, (2003) 117 Wash. App. 602, 72 P. 3d. 780 was thus wrongly decided, for it did not consider the limitation to the Troxel minimum.

            Moss CSC and Ballek, supra, are also reversed in part by the subsequent Troxel decision.  Doe does not contradict Troxel because the Hawaiian support order in question was only for $50.00 per month, Doe at 125 P. 3d. 465, arguably within the Troxel minimum.

V.        AS TO THE STATE’S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS ON

            APPEAL

 

            The argument that a good faith or meritorious appeal or motion to modify are not subject to sanctions under Civil Rule 11 or RCW 4.84.185 set forth on pages 46-47 of the Brief of Appellant is incorporated herein by reference.  Forster v. Pierce County, (2000) 99 Wash. App. 168, 183, 991 P. 2d. 687, rev. den. 141 Wash. 2d. 1010, 10 P. 3d. 407 finds:

A lawsuit is frivolous when it cannot be supported by any rational argument on the law or facts.  The statute also requires the action be frivolous in its entirety, i.e., if any of the claims asserted are not frivolous, then the action is not frivolous.

 

The statute being RCW 4.84.185.  Moss CCA, at 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 868-870 found the involuntary servitude and peonage challenge to child support enforcement requiring employment to be supported by a rational argument on the law or facts.  It found the argument meritorious.  A citation of this decision is a rational argument on the law.

            Decisions by the Ninth Circuit and by the California Supreme Court are not binding on the courts of Hawaii, in that Doe, at 125 P. 3d. 474-475 found frivolous an argument that Moss CSC at 950 P. 2d. 80 found to have been relied upon in good faith:

      Nonetheless, the judgment of the Court of Appeal must be affirmed. Our disapproval of Todd insofar as it might apply to child support orders and of In re Feiock insofar as that decision placed the burden on a petitioner to prove that a nonsupporting parent had the ability to pay may reasonably be seen as both an unanticipated expansion of the law of contempt in the child support context and a change in the evidentiary burden of which Brent had no notice at the time of trial. Neither rule may be retroactively applied therefore.

 

“In re Feiock” is In re Feiock, (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 141.

            Indeed, Doe and his attorneys were sanctioned for asking the Hawaii Supreme Court to establish binding precedent in the Hawaii courts on a question of law that the Hawaii courts had previously not addressed.  Therefore, as of December 27, 2005, any litigant who brings an eminently good faith argument before the courts of Hawaii is subject to sanctions merely for losing.[7]  Hawaii has thus adopted the English rule and rejected the American rule for attorney’s fee awards.  The American rule recognizes that “loser pays” is a doctrine that unfairly favors deep pocketed litigants who can afford the risk of paying a winning party’s costs and attorney’s fees at the expense of individual persons who lack such excessive wealth.

            Fortunately, Hawaii Supreme Court decisions are not binding on Washington courts and as Mr. Knight pleads arguments and cites authorities not made or cited in Moss CSC, Ballek, or Doe, and not addressed in the State’s Brief of Respondent, then Washington law prohibits any sanctions upon Mr. Knight and requires reversal or vacation of the $900.00 in sanctions imposed by the Order on Civil Motion, CP 126-128.

VI.       CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated herein, the decision by the superior court should be reversed: the Order on Contempt, Sub No. 199, CP 1-5 imposing employment and employment seeking requirements be declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994, the Antipeonage Act, and the sanctions imposed by the Order on Civil Motion, CP 126-128 be vacated or reversed.

Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of May, 2006,

 

                                                ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, pro se