I.          IDENTITY OF THE MOVING PARTY

            Roger W. Knight, appellant.

II.        RELIEF SOUGHT

            Reconsideration of the per curiam decision by this Court on Appeal entered on November 14, 2005.

III.       STANDARDS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION

            RAP 12.4(c) reads:

c) Content. The motion should state with particularity the points of law or fact which the moving party contends the court has overlooked or misapprehended, together with a brief argument on the points raised.

 

IV.       DECISION IN THIS CASE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY

            CONSIDER FREE SPEECH ISSUE RAISED IN BRIEFS

 

            In its per curiam decision this Court found:

      Knight further argues that a writ of prohibition was proper because the court issuing the show cause order improperly punished him for exercising his right to free speech.  In support of his argument, he cites Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 97 S. Ct. 1045, 51 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1977).  In that case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari after the District Court of Oklahoma County entered a pre-trial order that enjoined members of the media from publishing the name or picture of a child in connection with a juvenile proceeding.  The decision was based upon the settled principle that what transpires at a public hearing may not be subject to prior restraint.  Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. at 311.

      The order to show cause in Knight's contempt proceeding did not involve the prior restraint of protected speech.  Oklahoma Publishing, therefore, does not support a writ of prohibition in this case.  Nor do any of the other cases that Knight cites support his argument that a writ of prohibition was proper.  None of them involves a writ of prohibition being issued following contempt proceedings for failure to comply with a court order or anything analogous to the circumstances in this case.  The court that issued the contempt order had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, and statutory authority to issue contempt orders in child support proceedings.  If the order was issued in error or because the superior court was biased against him, Knight could have appealed the order.  Knight has not shown that an appeal of that order was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.  The lower court, therefore, properly denied his request for a writ of prohibition.

 

            Prior restraint was never the issue in this case.  The issue was that there is actual evidence in the record of an improper motive for the order to show cause: frustration with previous litigation success and the exercise of free speech rights.  The logic of Oklahoma Publishing is that while the Oklahoma media were free to appeal the decision, they were nevertheless entitled to use of the writs procedure under Oklahoma law.  As argued on p. 16 of the Brief of Appellant, 12 OSA §§1451-1462 sets forth a statutory scheme for writs similar to chapter 7.16 RCW.

            Restrictions on speech are almost always accorded with strict scrutiny, for absent true threat and other recognized exceptions to the Constitutional right to freedom of speech and press, which clearly includes publication of materials on the Internet, rational argument cannot be made that a legitimate interest of government justifies prohibiting or punishing a citizen affected by such government policy from discussing it with the public from his point of view.

            Where a governmental action, even where the government ordinarily has the right or prerogative to conduct such action, whether it is in the hiring and firing of government employees, the granting or denial of licenses to citizens, or discretionary decision as to whether to prosecute a citizen for a crime or for civil contempt, it is well established that such government action is unconstitutional if it is motivated by Constitutionally protected speech on the part of the person adversely affected by such government action.

            This protection of free speech is as entitled to remedy under the Writs Act as the protection from prior restraint.

            This Court reached this issue when it found that the superior court had in personam jurisdiction over Mr. Knight.

V.        CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated herein, reconsideration of the per curiam decision by this Court on Appeal entered on November 14, 2005, should be granted.

VI.       COPY OF THE DECISION ATTACHED

            A copy of the per curiam decision is attached herein.

Respectfully submitted this 16th day of November, 2005,

 

                                                ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, pro se

If the back button does not take you there, click Home to go to the Index page of this Antipeonage Act Website, click Enemies for the main Enemies page, click Letters for the Letters page, and click Allies for the Allies page. Click 04-2-10673-7 SEA to get to the main page for this case.  Or you can use the Antipeonage Act Site Map.