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                          Court of Appeals Division I
                               State of Washington

                            Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number:       54518-3-I
Title of Case:       ROGER W. KNIGHT, APP. VS STATE OF WA. EX
                     REL. ROYANNE M. SCHMITZ, ET AL., RES.
File Date:           11/14/2005


                                SOURCE OF APPEAL
                                ----------------
Appeal from Superior Court of King County
Docket No:      04-2-10673-7
Judgment or order under review
Date filed:     07/07/2004
Judge signing:  Hon. James a Doerty


                                     JUDGES
                                     ------
            Mary Kay Becker
            Anne Ellington
            William Baker


                                COUNSEL OF RECORD
                                -----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s)
            Roger W. Knight (Appearing Pro Se)
            P.O. Box 3444
            Seattle, WA  98114

            John R Scannell
            ActionLaw.net
            PO Box 3254
            Seattle, WA  98114-3254

Counsel for Respondent(s)
            Jacqueline L. Jeske
            Attorney at Law
            E400 King County Courthouse
            516 3rd Ave
            Seattle, WA  98104


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION I

ROGER W. KNIGHT,                                 ) NO. 54518-3-I
                                                 )
               Appellant,                        )
                                                 )
v.                                               )
                                                 )
STATE OF WASHINGTON ex rel.                      ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROY ANNE SCHMITZ, NORM                           )
MALENG, King County Prosecutor,                  )
KATHLEEN ANN O'BRIEN, Chief of                   )
Family Support Division of King County           )
Prosecutor, LLOYD PATRICK CORGAN,                )
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and                 )
JENNIFER MARIE SANDVIK, Deputy                   )
Prosecuting Attorney,                            )
                                                 )
               Respondents.                      ) FILED: NOVEMBER 14, 2005

     PER CURIAM.  Roger Knight appeals an order denying his request for a
writ of prohibition to prevent another court from holding him in contempt
for his failure to pay past due child support.  The lower court properly
denied Knight's request because he did not satisfy the requirements of RCW
7.16.300 for the issuance of such a writ.  We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2004, a King County Superior Court ordered Roger Knight to appear
on May 12, 2004 to show cause why he should not be found in contempt for
failing to pay past due child support.  Knight was personally served with
the order to show cause when he was in a King County courthouse to attend a
hearing in another case.
Two days before the scheduled show cause hearing, Knight filed an
application for a statutory writ of prohibition to bar the State from
proceeding with its motion for a contempt order.  He claimed that the court
did not have in personam jurisdiction over him, arguing that a person is
immune from service when he attends a court hearing in a criminal case.
Knight did not appear at the show cause hearing as ordered, but his lawyer
appeared on his behalf.  The court continued the hearing to June 16, but
neither Knight nor his counsel appeared on that date.  The court continued
the hearing a second time, to July 8, 2004.
On July 6, 2004, Knight sent the State an e-mail indicating that he
intended to appear before Judge James Doerty at 1:30 the next day on his
application for a writ of prohibition.  But when the State's counsel went
to Judge Doerty's court on the afternoon of July 7, the court staff
notified counsel that Knight had presented his application and proposed
order for a writ of prohibition earlier that day.  Judge Doerty, however,
had denied Knight's request for the writ, stating that Knight failed to
make a prima facie showing he was entitled to a writ.  Knight immediately
filed a notice of appeal of Judge Doerty's order.
The next day, Knight failed to appear at the show cause hearing on the
State's motion for contempt, and a court commissioner issued a warrant for
his arrest.  Knight filed a motion for reconsideration and a request for a
stay pending his appeal of the order denying his request for a writ, but
the court denied the motion.  Knight also filed a motion in this court to
quash the bench warrant and stay the contempt proceeding, but this court
denied the motion.  Knight filed a motion in the Supreme Court of
Washington for discretionary review of this court's decision denying his
motion to quash the bench warrant and stay the contempt proceeding, but
that motion also was denied.
ANALYSIS
Knight contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a
writ of prohibition.  He argues that such a writ was proper because the
court that found him in contempt did not have personal jurisdiction over
him.  We disagree.
A statutory writ is an extraordinary remedy that may be issued when there
is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law:
It may be issued by any court, except district or municipal courts, to an
inferior tribunal, or to a corporation, board or person, in all cases where
there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It is issued upon affidavit, on the application of the person
beneficially interested.

RCW 7.16.300; see also City of Kirkland v. Ellis, 82 Wn. App. 819, 827, 920
P.2d 206 (1996).
Two conditions are essential before a writ of prohibition may issue:  the
absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy and an absence or excess of
jurisdiction.  Adams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Wn.2d 834, 836, 355 P.2d 838
(1960).  The determination whether there is an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law rests within the discretion of the superior court
and is based upon the facts of the case.  City of Kirkland, 82 Wn. App. at
827 n.6.
In a divorce case, the court's jurisdiction of both the subject matter and
the parties continues until all of the obligor's duties of support,
including arrearages, have been satisfied:  'The court retains continuing
jurisdiction under this chapter until all duties of either support or
spousal maintenance, or both, of the obligor, including arrearages, have
been satisfied.'  RCW 26.18.040(3); State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wn.
App. 602, 607-08, 72 P.3d 780 (2003).  A statute specifically provides that
a court may issue an order requiring an obligor to show cause why he or she
should not be held in contempt when the court has reasonable cause to
believe that the obligor has failed to comply with a support order.  RCW
26.18.050(1).  That statute provides that service of the order to show
cause shall be 'by personal service, or in the manner provided in the civil
rules of superior court or applicable statute.'  RCW 26.18.050(2).  If the
obligor fails to appear as ordered, the court may issue a bench warrant for
the obligor's arrest.  RCW 26.18.050(3).
Knight argues that the court in the contempt case did not have jurisdiction
over him because he was personally served with the order to show cause at
the courthouse after attending a hearing in a criminal case.  He claims he
was immune from personal service while appearing for the other matter.  But
the jurisdiction of a court in child support proceedings continues until
all duties of support are satisfied.  RCW 26.18.040(3) ('The court retains
continuing jurisdiction under this chapter until all duties of either
support or spousal maintenance, or both, of the obligor, including
arrearages, have been satisfied'); see also RCW 26.18.050(5) ('As provided
in RCW 26.18.040, the court retains continuing jurisdiction under this
chapter and may use a contempt action to enforce a support or maintenance
order until the obligor satisfies all duties of support').  Personal
service of the order to show cause was required not for purposes of
jurisdiction, but rather to ensure proper notice of the proceeding.
     Knight argues that a person appearing in court as ordered in a
criminal case is immune from service of process.  The only authorities he
cites in support of that argument, however, are cases involving non-
residents.  See State ex rel. Gunn v. Superior Court, 111 Wash. 187, 189 P.
1016 (1920) (out-of-state resident); Goldsberry v. Lewis, 220 Kan. 69, 551
P.2d 862 (1976) (out-of-state resident); Turnbow v. Powers, 620 P.2d 403
(Ok. 1980) (out-of-county resident).  Knight has not cited any authority,
nor have we found any, holding that one who attends a court proceeding
within the county in which he resides is immune from service of process
while appearing at or traveling to that proceeding.
     Knight contends, however, that there is no rational basis to treat
residents and non-residents differently and, therefore, granting immunity
from service of process to non-residents but not residents violates the
Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Washington Constitutions.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
"No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."  The Washington State Constitution provides:
No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or
corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.

Const. art. I, sec.  12.
     The right to equal protection guarantees that persons receive like
treatment when they are situated similarly with respect to a legitimate
purpose of the law.  State v. Harner, 153 Wn.2d 228, 235, 103 P.3d 738
(2004).  The level of scrutiny employed to determine whether the equal
protection clause has been violated depends upon the right at issue or the
classification of persons affected.  See Harner, 153 Wn.2d at 235.  If a
classification affects a fundamental right or a suspect class, strict
scrutiny is applied;  intermediate scrutiny is applied when a
classification affects both a liberty right and a semi-suspect class that
is not accountable for its status; otherwise, the rational basis test is
applied.  Id.  Under the rational basis test, a legislative classification
is upheld unless it rests upon grounds wholly irrelevant to achieving a
legitimate state objective.  Harner, 153 Wn.2d at 235-36.  We apply the
rational basis test in this case because Knight has not shown that immunity
from service of process while attending a court hearing is a fundamental
right or that residents are a suspect or semi-suspect class.
     There is a rational basis for granting immunity from service of
process for non-residents but not residents.  The basis for the distinction
is apparent from the purpose underlying immunity for non-residents:
The underlying purpose of the rule extending immunity from the service of
unrelated civil process to nonresident suitors and witnesses, attending
upon a local civil judicial proceeding, is to insulate the pending
litigation against the interference and vexation which might arise from the
untimely intervention of unrelated litigation.  It proceeds upon the ground
that courts should not permit the progress of a civil trial to be
interrupted by the service of process in other civil suits, the portent of
which could prevent or tend to discourage the voluntary attendance of those
nonresident persons whose presence is essential or desirable if justice in
the pending cause is to be fully and fairly administered. The privilege of
the immunity is, therefore, primarily a privilege of the courts rather than
a privilege of the individual, resting, as it does, upon the foundation of
judicial convenience and the furtherance of the orderly and unfettered
administration of justice.  The exemption provided by the privilege,
however, is not one to be arbitrarily and rigorously enforced upon all
occasions; but, rather, it can and should be extended or withheld only as
judicial necessities dictate.

Anderson v. Ivarsson, 77 Wn.2d 391, 393, 462 P.2d 914 (1969).
     Immunity from service of process is not necessary to further the
orderly and unfettered administration of justice when a party or witness is
a resident because state residents are subject to the jurisdiction of the
court.1  See RCW 4.28.020 (court obtains jurisdiction by service of
summons); see also RCW 4.28.080(15) (delivering a copy of the summons to
the defendant in person constitutes personal service).  In contrast, the
court acquires jurisdiction over a non-resident only if the non-resident
does certain acts, such as transacting business, committing a tortious act,
or owning property within the state.  RCW 4.28.185.  Personal service on an
out-of-state defendant is valid only if an affidavit is filed showing that
service cannot be effected within the state.  RCW 4.28.185(4).

     Because residents are subject to the jurisdiction of Washington
courts, immunity from service of process is not necessary to further the
administration of justice.  This constitutes a rational basis for
distinguishing between resident and non-resident defendants in granting
immunity from service of process while appearing in court.  Therefore, the
distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States or Washington constitutions.
     Knight further argues that a writ of prohibition was proper because
the court issuing the show cause order improperly punished him for
exercising his right to free speech.  In support of his argument, he cites
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 97 S. Ct. 1045, 51
L. Ed. 2d 355 (1977).  In that case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari after the District Court of Oklahoma County entered a pre-trial
order that enjoined members of the media from publishing the name or
picture of a child in connection with a juvenile proceeding.  The decision
was based upon the settled principle that what transpires at a public
hearing may not be subject to prior restraint.  Oklahoma Publishing, 430
U.S. at 311.
     The order to show cause in Knight's contempt proceeding did not
involve the prior restraint of protected speech.  Oklahoma Publishing,
therefore, does not support a writ of prohibition in this case.  Nor do any
of the other cases that Knight cites support his argument that a writ of
prohibition was proper.  None of them involves a writ of prohibition being
issued following contempt proceedings for failure to comply with a court
order or anything analogous to the circumstances in this case.
The court that issued the contempt order had jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter, and statutory authority to issue contempt orders in
child support proceedings.  If the order was issued in error or because the
superior court was biased against him, Knight could have appealed the
order.  Knight has not shown that an appeal of that order was not a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy.  The lower court, therefore, properly denied
his request for a writ of prohibition.
CONCLUSION
Knight has failed to show that he was entitled to a writ of prohibition.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
          FOR THE COURT:

1 Knight complains about courts distinguishing between in-county and out-of-
county residents, but he has not shown that courts make such a distinction
in relation to personal jurisdiction.